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Abstract 
 
Business ethics refers to the examining right or wrong human behavior in business 
settings. A common human behavior in the business world is decision making, and 
some of the most important decisions made by business leaders are those that involve 
responding to ethical dilemmas. Leader ethical decision making is a skillset that can be 
improved to yield better results for organizations. Theoretical models have been used by 
leaders to guide decision making efforts in the past, but more effective models have 
been identified for guiding ethical decision making. The present study uses a 
historiometric approach to explore ethical decisions by business leaders in real-world 
settings through the lens of sensemaking, a theoretical model shown to improve ethical 
decision making outcomes. Mechanisms that operate on sensemaking are tested 
revealing specific cognitive biases that decrease leader ethical decisions and specific 
strategies that increase leader ethical decision making. Implications for biases and 
strategies are discussed and the financial impact of leader ethical decisions on 
organizations is explored. 
Key words: business ethics, ethical decision making, biases, strategies, sensemaking, 
leaders
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Introduction 
Recent years have brought many changes to the operating environment of U.S. 
businesses. The economic downturn of 2008 left many wondering who was to blame for 
corporate-level failures including the corporate scandals the rocked the business world 
(e.g. WorldCom, Enron, Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Countrywide Financial, 
and JP Morgan Chase). Such scandals have led to an increased prevalence of 
discussions surrounding business ethics, and ultimately to a perception that businesses 
in today’s world are operating less ethically than those of the past. While this perception 
isn’t necessarily accurate (Ethics Resource Center, 2014), it has prompted scientific, 
political, and social inquiry into the nature of business ethics, the effect(s) of ethicality, 
and the individuals responsible for ensuring morality in the business-operating 
environment.  
Ethics Resource Center (2014), reports a 14% decrease between 2007 and 2013 
in the numbers of workers reporting observed misconduct while on the job, and a 2% 
drop in the number of workers that felt pressured to compromise their own moral 
standards. Continued inquiry into the area of business ethics may foster continued 
improvement of ethical business practices. In order to continue improving, a deeper 
understanding of ethicality in the business world must be developed concerning 
ethicality in relation to the business world. Business ethics is defined as “the study of 
what constitutes right and wrong, or good and bad, human conduct in a business context 
(Shaw & Barry, 2013, p. 3) Although often considered entities in a legal sense, 
corporations, as a whole, do not make decisions. Rather, decision making is a function 
of management with the organization. A logical starting point in attempting to better 
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understand ethics in business is to examine the decisions made by leaders (such as 
majority shareholders, founding partners, Chairman, and Chief Executive Officers) 
within those organizations. These individuals are viewed as the personification of the 
corporate entity. Although decisions are made by a small group of stakeholders, their 
actions and decisions represent the entire organization, and decision makers are viewed 
as contracting agents of the organization (Herman, 1981). 
The nature of decision making by business leaders make it a critical process 
(Fleishman et al., 1991; Mumford, Campion, & Morgeson, 2007; Mumford, Zaccaro, 
Harding, Jacobs, & Fleishman, 2000) for both short and long term success. 
Complicating the decision making process is the uncertain, unpredictable, and 
ambiguous nature of the business world (Marion & Uhl-bien, 2001; Mathews, White, & 
Long, 1999; Mumford, Peterson, MacDougall, & Zeni, in press; Sonenshein, 2007). In 
such circumstances, traditional models of decision making (e.g., rational decision 
making) may not fully recognize the complexity of the situation. Sensemaking, an 
alternate model to understanding organizational decision making that incorporates 
multiple frames of reference and shows promise in terms of organizational outcomes in 
crisis-like or ambiguous situations (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 1998), may 
prove more useful for examining ethical decision making in organizations. As such, the 
current study examines the decisions made by organization leaders from a sensemaking 
perspective (Weick, 1995) in order to identify process improvements that yield more 
desirable results during ethical dilemmas. 
 In light of growing complexities when interacting between national and 
international social and legal systems, moral dilemmas, or ethical decisions, are 
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increasingly prevalent in today’s business environment (Luftig & Ouellette, 2009). The 
nature of ethical dilemmas in leader decisions stems from the impact on groups and/or 
other individuals that may not be directly tied to the organization (Brown, Treviño, & 
Harrison, 2005; Clarkson, 1995; Goodpaster, 1991; Hasnas, 1998; Messick & 
Bazerman, 2006). Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), posits organizational 
performance is contingent on generating profit as well as considering a much larger 
group with vested interest including customers, business partners, politicians, and 
societal entities (e.g., communities in which businesses operate, special interest groups, 
etc.). The change in scope from traditional shareholder perspectives to stakeholder 
perspectives complicates the decision-making process of organizational leaders by 
creating countless contingencies. When business leaders fail to consider the impact of 
organizational decisions on societal groups, or make decisions that reflect the best 
interest of only one group (shareholders), negative consequences can result regardless 
of intent (Gatewood & Carroll, 1991). 
 The current study employs stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) as a framework 
for understanding the impact of ethical decisions by organizational leaders on 
organizational performance. Research on ethical leadership (Brown & Treviño, 2006; 
Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005) ties ethical decisions to micro-level outcomes such 
as follower trust, job satisfaction, and perceived effectiveness of the leader. However, 
little research to date has examined micro-level leader decisions on macro-level 
outcomes, specifically organizational performance. For example, Ashford & Gibbs 
(1990) examine the influence of ethicality on stakeholder perceptions of legitimacy but 
do not examine “hard” measures of performance. This study examines the influence of 
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ethicality on performance as determined by the organization’s market value and seeks to 
establish the business case for ethical decision making. 
Improving Ethical Decision Making 
 News from the Ethics Resource Center (2014) shows promising evidence that 
ethics, and ethical decision making, is a skillset that can be improved through training 
interventions. Organizations increasingly focus on ethical awareness and interventions 
through creating executive-level, Ethics Officer, roles within their structures 
(Donaldson, 2003). Training and heightened awareness of business ethics is a sentiment 
echoed in professional preparation programs as well. This is evident in increasing focus 
on teaching business ethics as part of business school curricula, specifically as part of 
professional development within MBA programs (Donaldson, 2003; Gloeckler, 2012). 
Researchers have demonstrated promising results for graduate students in controlled 
studies evaluating ethical decision making subsequent to training interventions 
(Mumford et al., 2008). Similar interventions may be beneficial for business leaders 
tasked with decision making on behalf of their organizations. 
The decisions made by business leaders are critical to organizational success and 
therefore one of the more important aspects of leaderships in the modern world 
(Fleishman et al., 1991, Mumford et al., 2000). Normative approaches to business ethics 
and ethical decision making dictate that leaders must identify an ethical dilemma, and 
then apply a moral code or standard to evaluating potential courses of action (Jones, 
1991; Rest, 1986). Centuries of philosophical debate have led to three prevalent moral 
codes for decision making; the rights perspective, the justice perspective, and the 
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utilitarian perspective (De George, 1990; Gatewood & Carroll, 1991; Velasquez, 1982). 
Rights theories maintain that ethically acceptable decisions are those that protect the 
individual rights or entitlements (i.e., property, personal, legal, and moral). Justice 
perspectives suggest the best ethical decisions result from treating all persons with 
fairness, equity, and impartiality. Utilitarian theories maintain the best ethical decisions 
are the ones that produce the best outcome for the greatest number of people (Gatewood 
& Carroll, 1991). While useful guidelines or what leaders “should” do, in real-world 
business application these theories are wanting (Sonenshein, 2007). Business leaders 
often find themselves in situations where normative viewpoints compete with one 
another (De George, 1990). Further, the complex and ambiguous nature of today’s 
operating environments (De George, 2000; Marion & Uhl-bien, 2001; Mathews, White, 
& Long, 1999) prevents leaders from successfully evaluating alternatives and outcomes 
against a normative prescription (Sonenshein, 2007). Finally, multiple stakeholders 
(Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Goodpaster, 1991; Hasnas, 1998) may 
have competing interests, and cross-stakeholder interactions resulting from leader 
decisions to optimize results for one interest can create an ethical concern for another 
(Barry, 1986; Gatewood & Carroll, 1991). 
 Rather than rely on normative theories with equivocal results, current research 
on sensemaking provides leaders with a pragmatic framework for decision making 
(Mumford et al., 2008; Sonenshein, 2007; Thiel, Bagdasarov, Harkrider, Johnson, & 
Mumford, 2012). In simplest terms, sensemaking (Weick, 1995) is a series of cognitive 
processes in which an individual engages when deciding a course of action. More 
specifically, sensemaking is a flexible framework that allows for the incorporation of 
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contextual, behavioral, and normative elements into the decision making process, 
making it ideal for novel, complex, and ambiguous situations such as those faced by 
organizational leaders (Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron, & Antes, 2009; Mumford, 
Friedrich, Caughron, & Byrne, 2007; Strange & Mumford, 2005). When engaging in 
sensemaking, leaders first recognize a problem and compare current situational 
elements to prior ones (Reiter-Palmon, Mumford, Boes, & Runco, 1997), and then form 
a mental model of the problem at hand (Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; Johnson-
Laird, 1983). The mental model is then used to guide subsequent sensemaking 
processes such as information gathering, alternative evaluation, and contingency 
planning (Thiel et al., 2012; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). The extent to which 
leaders successfully navigate the various processes suggested by sensemaking theory 
(Weick, 1995) effects the overall quality of their ethical choices (Caughron et al., 2011; 
Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004; Hogarth & Makridas, 1981). 
Weick (1995) introduced the theory of sensemaking as a model for how 
individuals interpret, understand, and then act based on their social environments. 
Within organizational settings, sensemaking presents an alternative, descriptive, model 
for decision making (Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005) that better 
explains leader behavior than classic, normative decision making models (cf. Simon, 
1960, 1979). Weick (1995) posits individuals will first utilize clues to alert them to a 
change in status quo, then actively seek information, interpret that information based on 
established cognitive framework(s), and then act based on their interpretation. 
Importantly, Weick (1995) suggests that the process is ongoing and dynamic wherein 
reality is formed based on the outcomes of sensemaking, a process called enactment. 
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This social constructionist viewpoint of decision making allows for the incorporation of 
multiple and often competing cognitive frameworks or schemas, individual perceptions 
and biases, and an explanatory mechanism for the often complicated and dynamic 
interaction between individuals and their respective environments (Gioia, 2006).  
Individuals engage in sensemaking when faced with situations of ambiguity or 
equivocality, characterized by multiple and potentially competing interpretations of 
events or information, or situations of uncertainty where the probability of outcomes 
based on alternatives choices is unknown (Sonenshein, 2007; Weick, 1979, 1995). 
Given that the business environment is largely characterized by ambiguity and 
uncertainty as well (Marion & Uhl-bien, 2001; Mathews et al, 1999), sensemaking 
becomes a promising lens through which understanding and making business decisions 
can be examined. First, myriad research employs sensemaking as a theory for 
examining crises as well as change in organizations (see Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; 
Weick, 1988), both situations that are characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Ethical dilemmas are also characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty (Sonenshein, 
2007), making them highly relevant for examination through the lens of sensemaking. 
Further, Weick’s (1995) social construction perspective anchored to sensemaking 
theory suggests the actions taken by leaders create the circumstances in which the 
organization must then operate through enactment. Given that ethical dilemmas are 
manifested by prior leader decisions that negatively impact one or more stakeholder 
groups (Gatewood & Carroll, 1991), sensemaking theory provides a framework for 
understanding how organizations find themselves faced with ethical dilemmas and how 
subsequent decision making may either ameliorate or exacerbate the situation (Weick, 
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1998). Finally, a central tenet of Weick’s sensemaking is the interpretation of 
information based on the individual’s prior experience (1995). Prior social experiences 
provide a framework, or mental model, for attempting to understand information 
retrospectively (Weick et al., 2005). Frameworks may be generated from prior personal 
and/or professional experience, and information may take on different meanings 
depending on which framework it is analyzed through. In terms of ethical decision 
making, incorporating the existence of multiple frameworks eliminates the need to 
adopt any one philosophical approach to business ethics and promotes making the most 
effective decision given all perspectives considered. However, with the existence of 
multiple frameworks comes the potential for those frameworks to generate competing 
interpretations of information further adding to ambiguity and uncertainty (Weber & 
Glynn, 2006). While speaking to the complexity of ethical dilemmas, multiple 
frameworks and retrospective analysis also implies the presence of cognitive bias in the 
sensemaking process.   
Cognitive Bias 
At the heart of the sensemaking process is mental model development of the 
decision at hand (Hogarth & Makridakis, 1981). The interpretation of the situation, 
decision, collected information, etc. rests with the mental model developed by the 
leader (Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004).  Information about the decision-making task 
directly influences the mental model that is developed (Mumford, Baughman, Supinski, 
& Maher, 1996; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, & Redmond, 
1994), and sensemaking theory (Weick, 1995) dictates that information is absorbed by 
the leader through their own individual frameworks. As such, the process of gathering 
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and interpreting information and subsequent mental model formation, is subject to 
cognitive bias. Indeed, cognitive bias has been shown to reduce the efficacy of ethical 
leader decision making (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Hammond, Keeney, & 
Raiffa, 2006; Messick & Bazerman, 1996; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006; 
Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). From the perspective of the sensemaking process 
and decision making process, cognitive bias exerts influence on mental model 
construction, as well as on the evaluation of solution alternatives and outcomes based 
on those mental models. 
Caughron et al. (2011) simplify explanations of sensemaking by describing it in 
terms of three component processes; problem recognition, information gathering and 
interpretation, and information integration. During problem recognition, leaders must 
recognize events or situations as deviating from what is normal or expected and then 
decide whether or not action should be taken. During information gathering and 
interpretation, leaders actively pursue information regarding the problem and attempt to 
make sense of, or interpret its meaning. During information integration, leaders connect 
the information they’ve obtained in meaningful ways in an attempt to produce a 
complete image, or mental model, of the problem and utilize this model as the basis for 
decision making. A review of current literature on business practices, organizational 
behavior, and management reveals the prevalence of several cognitive biases that may 
influence sensemaking during each stage of the process.  
Cognitive bias can interfere with problem recognition resulting in a leader that 
fails to see an ethical dilemma, or purposefully decides to ignore one and not take 
further action. For example, inability to recognize social cues may result in a leader that 
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fails to see the ethical implications of a pending decision. In doing so, the leader 
overlooks the complexity of the situation and ultimately either relies on programmed 
decision making and heuristics, or builds an inappropriately limited mental model. 
Researchers have previously ascribed failure to recognize ethical dilemmas as a primary 
reason for making unethical decisions (Jones, 1991; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Rest, 1986). 
Subsequent research has provided support for moral insensitivity as a predictor of 
unethical decisions (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008; Harman, 1999; Rachlinski, 
2004), and unethical decisions by business leaders in particular (Bradford & Garrett, 
1995; Smith, Skalnik, & Skalnik, 1999; Wittmer, 2000).  
Decision-makers may engage in self-handicapping by allowing obstacles and/or 
setbacks to become excuses for avoiding problems, generating a self-fulfilling prophecy 
for failure (McCrea, 2008; McElroy & Crant, 208; Rhodewalt, Tragakis, & Finnerty, 
2006; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; Watson, Freeman, & Parmer, 2008). Leaders may 
obtain false consensus and incorrectly assume everyone involved in a situation shares 
their point of view; incorrectly assessing stakeholders concerns (Alick & Largo, 1995; 
Der Pligt, 1984; Krueger & Zeiger, 1993; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Marks & Miller, 
1987; Monin & Norton, 2003; Russell & Arms, 1995). Leaders may fail to 
appropriately question situations or actions and defer to the judgment of perceived 
experts or authority figures (Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009). Recognizing a problem 
also provides a catalyst for change. Failing to do so favors maintaining the status quo 
(Geletkanycz, 1997; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Kelley & Amburgery, 1991; Peterson, 
Owens, Tetlock, Fan, & Martorana, 1998; Ritoy & Baron, 1993; Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Sims, 1992). Leaders may also chose not to act in response to a 
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problem in order to avoid responsibility (Hawley, 1991; Novicevic, Buckley, & Harvey, 
2008; Wilson, 1993), or willfully ignore signs that a problem exists (Ehrich & Irwin, 
2005). 
During information gathering and interpreting, naively assessing individual 
levels of knowledge and expertise may may result in failure to seek additional 
information and differing perspectives (Akin, 2007; Froeb & Kobayashi, 1996). Leaders 
may assume too much responsibility for outcomes believing they alone are capable of 
optimally generating solutions and engaging in undue autonomy (Christensen & Kohls, 
2003; Gandz & Bird, 1996; Ludwig & Longenecker, 1993; Orpen, 197; VanSandt & 
Neck, 2003). Alternatively, as a means of avoiding personal blame for potential 
outcomes, leaders may purposefully involve others in the decision making process in 
order to diffuse their level of responsibility (Bandura, 1999; Dozier & Miceli, 1985; 
Forsyth, Zyzniewiski, & Giammanco, 2002; Whyte, 1991).  
The opportunity for the sensemaking process to incorporate multiple frames of 
reference can be both beneficial, as previously noted, and harmful. In terms of 
information gathering and interpretation, multiple frameworks for interpreting 
information can be problematic when leaders assign different weighting schemes to 
various frameworks. Such differential weighting is likely to skew mental model 
development in favor of one framework over the other. For example, leaders have both 
personal and professional frames of reference based on prior experiences (Weick, 1979, 
1995). When overly weighting one frame of reference (e.g. personal experiences), it is 
possible to neglect information pertaining to other frames of reference (e.g. 
professional) or to underestimate the significance of information to that frame, causing 
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the leader to inadequately balance their personal and professional roles (Floyd & Lane, 
2000; Marks & MacDermid, 1996; Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970; Tubre & Collins, 
2000). On a similar note, leaders may overlook the importance of standards and values 
associated with their personal frames in favor of the interests of the larger, social entity 
(the organizational or professional frame), which may or may not subscribe to the same 
level of standards and values. In doing so, leaders make unwarranted compromises of 
their own values to avoid conflict a social value system. Such framing issues during 
information interpretation result in the leader developing mental models that are either 
too narrow or too broad with respect to the scope of information included in the model 
(Hodgkinson, Maule, Brown, Pearman, & Glaister, 2002; Kühberger, Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002; Milch, Weber, Appelt, Handgraaf, & Krantz, 2009; 
Schoorman, Mayer, Douglas, & Hetrick, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Wright & 
Goodwin, 2002). 
Cognitive bias may impact ethical decision making by directing leaders to take 
unwarranted short-cuts through information integration process. Sensemaking is an 
active, effortful, and complex process (Weick, 1995). Leaders may feel it necessary to 
force a decision by prematurely taking action to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty, or 
satisfice instead of working toward an optimal decision (Bouckenooghe, Vanderheyden, 
Mestdagh, & Van Laethem, 2007; DeGrada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999; 
Dougherty & Harbison, 2007; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Roets & Van Hiel, 2008; 
Shiloh, Koren, & Zakay, 2001; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). Leaders may also reduce 
the effort put into sensemaking when they fail to consider the dynamic relationship 
between decisions and the resulting enacted environment and instead believe the 
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environment will simply respond in exactly the way they predicted by their illusion of 
control (Goodman & Irwin, 2006; Kottemann, Davis, & Remus, 1994; Moore, 
Kurtzberg, Fox, & Bazerman, 1999; Neil, Martz, & Biscaccanti, 2004). Over time, 
leaders may become rigid in their professional frameworks, ignoring environmental 
cues to update social information (e.g., organizational polices or professional 
guidelines) and misapply their existing outdated principles integrating outmoded criteria 
with new current problems (Deming et al., 2007; Hass, Malouf, & Mayerson, 1988). 
Finally, leaders may integrate only information that supports their prior assumptions or 
viewpoints as a means of justification (Levy & Hershey, 2008; Sharma, Albers-Miller, 
Pelton, & Straughan, 2006; Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008; Wolff & 
Moser, 2008). 
 The current study examines business leader ethical decisions for the prevalence 
of these sorts of cognitive biases. Building on prior research (Anderson, 2003; 
Butterfield, Teviño, & Weaver, 2000; Messick & Bazzerman, 1996; Mumford et al., 
2009a; Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2005; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), the 
following cognitive biases are examined: 1) abdication of responsibility, 2) changing 
norms and standards, 3) diffusion of responsibility, 4) false consensus, 5) forcing a 
decision, 6) framing, 7) illusion of control, 8) inadequate role balancing, 9) maintaining 
the status quo, 10) moral insensitivity, 11) naiveté, 12) self-handicapping, 13) self-
justification, 14) undue autonomy, 15) unquestioning deference to authority, 16) 
unwarranted compromise, and 17) willful ignorance. Expanded definitions of each 
cognitive bias may be found in Table 1. Based on the aforementioned prior research, the 
following hypothesis is suggested: 
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H1a: The prevalence of cognitive bias by business leaders when engaged in 
ethical decision making will increase the number of unethical decisions made by 
the leader.  
Effective mental model construction during sensemaking improves ethical decision 
making outcomes (Brock et al, 2008; Caughron et al., 2011; Mumford et al., 2008; 
Thiel et al., 2012). To the extent cognitive bias interferes with mental model creaiton 
(Banaji et al., 2003; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004) it is likely to impair leader’s ability 
to make ethical decisions as well as increasing their likelihood of making unethical 
decisions. The following hypothesis is suggested: 
H1b: The prevalence of cognitive bias by business leaders when engaged in 
ethical decision making will decrease the number of ethical decisions made by 
the leader. 
Because sensemaking (Weick, 1995) is a constructionist process where leaders shape 
reality based on past decisions, decision outcomes of sensemaking are likely to impact 
one another over time. As such, the influence of cognitive biases in the sensemaking 
process is likely to affect decision outcomes across multiple decisions. The following 
research question is proposed: 
R1: Leaders exhibiting greater degrees of cognitive biases in decision making 
will reduce the overall ethicality of the organization. 
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Compensatory Strategies 
Weick’s sensemaking theory and model for understanding decision making 
(1995) has yielded explanatory insights into the way leaders make decisions, 
particularly during times of crisis (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). Better understanding 
of how leaders make decisions not only provides a mechanism for explaining outcomes, 
but also a tool for making recommendations regarding decision process changes that 
yield improved outcomes (Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009; Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010; Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick, 1998; Weick et al., 2005). 
Improvement is obtained by developing leader skills and capabilities associated with 
individual parts of the sensemaking process (Weick et al., 2005). Applying the 
sensemaking framework to situations involving ethical dilemmas identifies 
opportunities for process improvement that yield better ethical decision outcomes 
(Sonenshein, 2007).  
Research on ethical decision making from a sensemaking perspective suggests 
development of cognitive, or compensatory, strategies that improve various stages of 
the sensemaking process and reduce cognitive bias (see Anderson, 2003; Butterfield et 
al., 2000; Darke & Chaiken, 2005; Kahneman, 2003; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). By 
combining sensemaking theory with a series of experimental and evaluation studies, 
Mumford and colleagues specify multiple compensatory strategies that improve ethical 
decision making outcomes (Brock et al., 2008; Caughron et al., 2011; Kligyte, Marcy, 
Sevier, Godfrey, & Mumford, 2008; Mumford et al., 2008; Mumford et al., 2009a). 
These compensatory strategies include recognizing circumstances, seeking outside help, 
questioning judgment, dealing with emotions, anticipating consequences of actions, 
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analyzing personal motives, and considering the effects of actions on others (Mumford 
et al., 2008). 
A review of organizational behavior and management literature suggests several 
compensatory strategies that operate on the component processes (Caughron et al., 
2011) of sensemaking yielding improved decision making. During problem recognition, 
leaders identify something is wrong and then decide to engage in subsequent processes. 
Understanding and applying professional guidelines identifies issues and signals the 
need for sensemaking over heuristic decision making processes (Deming et al., 2007; 
Haas et al., 1988). Once identified, a leader may selectively engage the problem or not 
based on likelihood of success (Dhar, 1996; Higgins, Camacho, Idson, Spiegel, & 
Scholer, 2008). Understanding decision making roles within larger social contexts and 
recognizing the boundaries of ones abilities is a way of gauging likelihood of success 
(Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Haas et al., 1986; Overholser & Fine, 
1990). Once committed, further action in sensemaking is directed toward deliberately 
and decisively achieving the optimal outcome (Ajzen, 1991; De Viries, Holland, & 
Witteman, 2008; Hofman, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Puca, 2004; Richetin, Perugini, 
Adjali, & Hurling, 2007). 
Multiple strategies exist for improving the information gathering stage of 
sensemaking as well. Information gathered during sensemaking is subject to 
interpretation (i.e., retrospective understanding) through prior personal and professional 
experiences or frameworks (Weick, 1995, 1998). Information is understood through the 
influence of multiple value systems (Freud & Krug, 2002; Fritzsche & Oz, 2007; Joyner 
& Payne, 2002; Mattison, 2000). Likewise, information is understood through varied 
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social norms (Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Frame & Williams, 2005; Knapp & 
VandeCreek, 2007; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008; Spicer, Dunfee, & Bailey, 2004; 
Westerman, Beekun, Stedham, & Yamamura, 2007). Information interpretation is 
retrospective and based on prior experiences. Assumptions regarding past experience 
should be monitored to assess their influence on information interpretation (Armor & 
Taylor, 203; Mumford, Schultz, & Van Doorn, 2001; Schwenk, 1989). Minimizing 
these influences on interpretation requires constant evaluation of individual biases in 
order to maintain an objective focus in the process (Caruso, 2008; Cokely & Feltz, 
2009; Wood, Atkins, & Tabernero, 2000). Due diligence to the sensemaking process 
will call for recognizing when information gathering has not been sufficient before 
moving on to later stages (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). 
During the information integration stage of sensemaking, a mental model of 
related to the decision-making task is created and used to generate and evaluate solution 
alternatives (Caughron et al., 2011). To be effective, mental models need sufficient 
breadth and depth to account for the complexity of the ethical dilemma (Kimmel, 1991; 
Mumford, 2002; Mumford, Schultz, & Osburn, 2002). Based on complexity evaluation 
of the mental model, a course of action must be selected. Strategy selecting of 
alternatives requires considering elements such desired outcomes, selection criteria, and 
decision rules (Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 1990; Chu & Spires, 2003; Mitchell, 1996; 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Strub, 1969). The outcomes of a decision may not 
always be favorable to all stakeholder groups. In such cases, striving for transparency in 
the process itself can build stakeholder acceptance (Malenko, 2014; Weston & Weston, 
2013). Sensemaking specifies a dynamic interaction between decisions and 
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environments. Contingency planning highlights alternative courses of action should 
sensemaking decisions not yield desired outcomes (Bloom & Menefee, 1994; Haas, 
2008; Posavac, Sanbonmatsu, & Frazio, 1997). The sensemaking process is complex 
and resource-intensive. Its success hinges on the decision maker’s desire to select 
optimal alternatives. Maintaining self-accountability and individual standards 
throughout the process promotes that desire (Collins & Stukas, 2008; Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999; Novicevic et al., 2008; Wolff & Moser, 2008).  
 Sonenshein (2007) suggests research on ethical decision making using 
sensemaking should migrate away from the scenarios and vignettes typically used 
because they fail to sufficiently mimic the complexity of the real world and truly engage 
the sensemaking process. The current study builds on research in ethical decision 
making by extending the strategies outlined by Mumford and colleagues (Mumford et 
al., 2008; Caughron et al., 2011) into a business context, and evaluates the effectiveness 
of sensemaking compensatory strategies by organizational leaders in a real-world 
context. Based on prior research, the following compensatory are evaluated: 1) 
complexity evaluation, 2) contingency planning, 3) deliberative action, 4) maintaining 
objective focus, 5) monitoring assumptions, 6) recognition of insufficient information, 
7) recognizing boundaries, 8) selective engagement, 9) self-accountability, 10) strategy 
selection, 11) striving for transparency, 12) understanding guidelines, and 13) 
value/norm assessment. For expanded definitions of these strategies see Table 2. Given 
the utility of the sensemaking framework for business leaders (Sonenshein, 2007; Thiel 
et al., 2012) and the success of compensatory strategies in improving ethical decision 
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making in academic contexts (Caughron et al., 2011; Brock et al., 2008; Kligyte et al., 
2008), the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H2a: The use of sensemaking compensatory strategies by business leaders will 
yield more ethical decisions.  
Unethical decisions are likely to result when decision makers are impaired by cognitive 
bias, fail to see ethical implications of problems, and do not engage in sensemaking 
(Jones, 1991; Mumford et al., 1994; Smith et al., 1999; Wittmer, 2000). Compensatory 
strategies can reduce cognitive biases that lead to unethical decisions by signaling 
sensemaking processes that encourage critical, in-depth thinking versus heuristic 
processing (Weick, 1995, 1998). As such, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H2b: The use of sensemaking compensatory strategies by business leaders will 
lead to fewer unethical decisions. 
The constructionist nature of sensemaking (Weick, 1995) suggests compensatory 
strategies may operate differently when leaders make multiple decisions over time that 
are influenced by prior decisions. The following research question is suggested: 
R2: Leaders that employ compensatory strategies while engaging in 
sensemaking when faced with ethical dilemmas will improve the overall 
ethicality of the organization. 
 Ethical Decisions and Organizational Performance 
 Since the Enron affair in the 1990’s, organizations have increased emphasis on 
ethical business practices, and society has increased scrutiny on the affairs of 
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organizations. Concurrently, there has been an increased interest in business ethics 
within academic communities (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Academics have 
taken business ethics research and discussion in two distinct directions - one empirical 
with focus on cause and effect relationships between business practices and outcomes 
and the other philosophical with focus on theoretical notions of the meaning and 
application of ethics within a business context (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; O’Fallon & 
Butterfield, 2005). After reviewing early academic work on business ethics, Kahn 
(1990) describes this dichotomy of focus as normative versus contextual. Normative 
approaches focus on what organizations should do, and rely on philosophical and 
theoretical perspectives (Weaver & Treviño, 1994). On the other hand, contextual work 
focuses on situational aspects of business ethics, individual behavior, and, by extension, 
organizational outcomes or results (Kahn, 1990; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005).  
 Building on the contextual side of research, academics can make pragmatic and 
beneficial recommendations to the business operating community (O’Fallon & 
Butterfield, 2005). As opposed to suggesting what business “should” do, the contextual, 
behavioral, or normative approach leverages empirical data from research to examine 
what people and businesses actually do (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). This data-
driven, normative approach adds utility to the business world and its leaders by 
examining causal relationships that predict real-world outcomes. Examining individual 
ethical behaviors and outcomes, otherwise known as behavioral ethics (see Jones, 1991; 
Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006), suggests further research on individual decision 
making within an ethical context is beneficial to the business community (Ford & 
Richardson, 1994, Low, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; 
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Trevino, 1986). The sensemaking approach allows for the exploration of individual 
behaviors within the behavioral ethics domain. 
Organizational Performance 
 Downstream effects of ethical decision making by organization leaders are of 
paramount importance. In today’s ethics-focused world, better ethical decision making 
by leaders is likely to improve organizational performance. Research by Brown et al. 
(2005) shows leader ethical behaviors, including decision making, are related to micro-
level organizational performance outcomes such as perceived leader effectiveness, 
subordinate job satisfaction, and employee dedication. However, absent from most 
discussions is the effect of ethical decision making on macro-level outcomes such as 
financial performance. Over time, individual decisions by leaders result in an 
organization that tends to behave either more or less ethically than others. Organizations 
that behave more ethically than others are those whose decisions consistently 
acknowledge the well-being of their various stakeholders.  
In describing stakeholder management and subsequent stakeholder theory, 
Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines stakeholders as, “any group or individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.” At its most basic, 
business ethics can be described as the moral code dictating organizational behavior and 
shaping the perceptions of organizational decisions as either right or wrong. By 
Freeman’s (1984) definition of stakeholders, leader ethical decision making is tied to 
stakeholder management in that any group potentially affected by leader ethical 
decision making would be consider a stakeholder for that organization. Freeman (1994) 
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elaborates on the tenants of stakeholder theory and explicitly ties business ethics to 
stakeholder management stating, “We cannot divorce the idea of a moral community or 
of a moral discourse from the ideas of the value-creation activity of business” (Freeman, 
1994, p. 419). Stakeholder theory provides a theoretical rationale for the business case 
(i.e., dollars and cents) behind ethical decision making.   
Donaldson and Preston (1995), add to the conceptualization of stakeholder 
theory by suggesting Freeman’s original theory is comprised of three distinct yet 
interrelated points of view. Specifically, stakeholder theory is descriptive, normative, 
and instrumental wherein descriptive stakeholder theory describes how managers 
actually behave, normative stakeholder theory informs how managers should behave, 
and instrumental stakeholder theory predicts the outcomes of managers’ behaviors. 
Although concluding that a normative basis is the best way to view stakeholder theory 
and that both descriptive and instrumental views can be subsumed under a normative 
perspective (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), subsequent research continues to maintain 
that stakeholder theory is instrumental and that stakeholder management positively 
predicts performance (Cragg, 2002; Doh & Quigley, 2014; Jones, 1995; Rowley & 
Berman, 2000). Specifically, research has found that stakeholder management increases 
motivation and organizational creativity (Zhang & Bartol, 2010), leverages diversity 
(Edmondson, 1999; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Thomas, 2004), and improves cross-cultural 
efficacy (Miska, Stahl, & Mendenhall, 2013; Stahl, Pless, & Maak, 2013).  
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) provides a framework sufficiently broad in 
breadth and depth to address the complexity of relationships in today’s business 
environment and to draw practical implications from those relationships (Mitchell, 
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Agle, & Wood, 1997). In terms of cause and effect, leader ethical decision making is 
directly tied to the effect of those decisions on stakeholders. An instrumental approach 
to stakeholder theory suggests consideration of stakeholder interests in decision making 
will increase organizational performance. Research ties stakeholder management to 
various organizational performance variables (Edmondson, 1999; Miska et al., 2013; 
Stahl et al., 2013; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Thomas, 2004; Zhang & Bartol, 2010), but the 
effect of stakeholder management on financial performance indicators, such as market 
value, remains relatively unexplored. The lack of empirical research in this area is noted 
in Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) critique of the three viewpoints associated with 
stakeholder theory and factors into their conclusion that stakeholder theory is normative 
in nature. However, their conclusion is rooted in a lack of research supporting the 
instrumental viewpoint. Research connecting organizational performance and 
stakeholder management suggests this conclusion to be premature as there is an 
instrumental value (rooted in tangible organizational outcomes such as financial 
performance) associated with stakeholder management as rooted in tangible 
organizational outcomes such as financial performance. 
Leaders that make ethically sound decisions by considering the interests of 
various stakeholders groups see increases in micro-level organizational performance 
outcomes. Signaling theory (Karasek & Bryant, 2012; Spence, 1973, 1974) suggests 
that markets, such as the stock market, are influenced by the explicit and implicit 
information made available by sellers (e.g., organizations). When leaders make ethically 
sound decisions, they implicitly signal stakeholders and non-stakeholders of their 
organization’s concern for stakeholder groups. Marcus & Goodman (1991) observed 
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that organizational decisions made during times of crisis, including ethical dilemmas, 
signaled either accommodative or defensive stances. They concluded accommodative 
stances (e.g., those acknowledging the concerns of stakeholders) are likely the best 
strategic response to preserve shareholder value across multiple types of crisis 
situations. When leaders consistently make ethically sound decisions, they signal the 
organizations accommodative policy standpoint and create value in the eyes of 
stakeholders. Additionally, micro-level performance gains resulting from leader ethical 
decision making signal organizational health and general performance to investors that 
influence macro-level performance outcomes, specifically, market value. Based on 
stakeholder theory and signaling theory, the aggregate effect of leader ethical decisions 
over time such as organizational ethicality, promotes macro-level outcomes by 
influencing financial performance as measured by shareholder value - the classic 
business case. The following hypothesis is suggested: 
 H3: Organizational ethicality will positively predict shareholder value above and 
beyond the general influence of market trends. 
Method 
 Business leaders and their corresponding organizations were selected for this 
study based on availability of data for both the leader and the organization. Cognitive 
bias and compensatory strategies were operationalized based on the definitions provided 
in Table 1 and Table 2. Organizational ethicality was operationalized as the aggregate 
number of ethical and unethical decisions reported for the organization by KLD 
25 
 
Research & Analytics Inc. Organizational performance was operationalized as average 
residual market return.  
Historiometric Method 
This study utilized historiometric methods for evaluating the cognitive biases 
and compensatory strategies used by organizational leaders when engaging in ethical 
decision making. Historiometric analyses are a method of quantifying human behavior 
based on accounts presented in historical documents such as biographies of well-known 
individuals, or in this case, organizational leaders (Simonton, 1999). Historiometric 
analysis is useful for measuring behavior information when direct access to the 
individuals of interest is not available and also allows for assessment of multiple 
individual behaviors in a real-word context when direct observation was not conducted 
and interview methods are either not possible or lack the requisite objectivity 
(Simonton, 1990).   
Biography Sampling 
 Biographical samples were obtained following procedures recommended by 
Simonton (1999) with one exception. While autobiographical sources are not typically 
included in historiometric analyses (Simonton, 1990), they were included in this study 
in order to increase availability of sample data. A search was conducted for available 
biographies using keywords “business” and “biography” using both the University of 
Oklahoma Library System as well as the Oklahoma Public Library System. Finally, to 
exclude any potential geographical bias in availability of biographies at those locations, 
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the same keywords were searched using Amazon.com to identify any additional 
materials in print.  
From these sources, only individuals that served in a leadership position (such as 
Chief Executive Officer or Chairman of the Board of Directors) within an organization 
were included. A second inclusion criterion was included to limit the search to 
individuals that served in leadership positions between the years of 1990 and 2005.  The 
conceptualization of what constitutes an ethical versus and unethical decision is subject 
to change over time as the values and norms of society at large change (Inglehart, 
1997). As such, the inclusion of historical data was limited to a period in which 
principles of ethics would closely resemble those of present day. In total, 100 
biographies and autobiographies of organizational leaders discussing organizational 
decision making events between 1990 and 2005 were identified using these criteria. 
Sample 
 Of the 100 organizational leaders for which historical data was available, the 
study required that organizational level performance data also be available. Specifically, 
stock market trading information was required of each organization. The 100 
organizational leaders were then limited to a final set of 65 containing only leaders that 
represented organizations that were publically traded on the U.S. Stock Exchange. For a 
complete list of leader biographies and autobiographies included in the study, see 
Appendix.  
Within this sample, 61 leaders were male and four female. Leader age, which 
was considered based on the time of their leadership role within the associated 
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organization, ranged from 19 to 64 years (M = 44.25, SD = 9.96), and their mean tenure 
within respective organizations as of 2005 was 13.5 years (SD = 10.19). The leaders 
represented a variety of different organizations. Fifty-four leaders represented large 
organizations (i.e., greater than 5,000 employees), three represented medium 
organizations (i.e., 500 to 5,000 employees, and two represented small organizations 
(i.e., less than 500 employees). Of these, the lifespan of organizations ranged from 7 to 
175 years (M = 68.22, SD = 48.68), with 49 of the 65 organizations still in existence as 
of 2012. The sample also represented a diverse set of industry sectors including 
Services (n = 18), Technology (n = 16), Consumer Goods (n = 12), Financial (n = 9), 
and other (n = 10). For a complete list of leaders, organizations, and descriptive 
variables see Table 3. 
Historiometric Content Analysis 
Included biographies and autobiographies were segmented by chapter to include 
only passages that referred to the time during which the leader made decisions for the 
associated organization. A group of six trained, expert raters read each set of associated 
chapters and evaluated the historical content for use of compensatory strategies and the 
prevalence of cognitive decision making biases by each leader using a benchmark rating 
scale. The rating scales were developed following the guidelines set forth by Redmond, 
Mumford, and Teach (1993). Operational definitions, anchors, and a 5-point, Likert-
type scale were constructed for each strategy and bias, wherein 1 indicated that the bias 
or strategy was never used or present and 5 indicated that use of a specific strategy or 
bias was evident in every decision discussed. Raters were then trained to evaluate the 
constructs based on operational definitions and the development of a shared mental 
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model of the meaning of the constructs. Several historical passages were rated 
independently after the initial training session. After assessing interrater agreement, a 
second training session was conducted to discuss discrepancies and deviations in mental 
models. A second series of historical training content was then evaluated and assessed 
before coding the remaining historical content. See appendix for the rater training 
materials including a complete list of operational definitions and anchors. 
Interrater agreement for rating scales was assessed using the rwg method. Rwg is a 
common method for measuring agreement when multiple raters are assessing the same 
target (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1993). Rwg measures 
closer to 1.00 suggest that raters generally agree on the quantification assigned to 
variables and share a unified understanding or mental model of the construct being 
measured. Interrater agreement for compensatory strategy variables across the six 
trained raters was as follows: Complexity Evaluation (rwg = .71), Contingency Planning 
(rwg = .76), Deliberative Action (rwg = .71), Maintaining Objective Focus (rwg = .76), 
Monitoring Assumptions (rwg = .70), Recognition of Insufficient Information (rwg = 
.74), Recognizing Boundaries (rwg = .73), Selective Engagement (rwg = .71), Self-
Accountability (rwg = .70), Strategy Selection (rwg = .70), Striving for Transparency (rwg 
= .74), Understanding Guidelines (rwg = .71), and Value/Norm Assessment (rwg = .73). 
Interrater agreement for cognitive bias variables was also assessed. Agreement 
across the six trained raters was as follows: Abdication of Responsibility (rwg = .76), 
Changing Norms and Standards (rwg = .76), Diffusion of Responsibility (rwg = .75), 
False Consensus (rwg = .71), Forcing a Decision (rwg = .73), Framing (rwg = .71), Illusion 
of Control (rwg = .72), Inadequate Role Balancing (rwg = .72), Maintaining the Status 
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Quo (rwg = .75), Moral Insensitivity (rwg = .74), Naiveté (rwg = .75), Self-Handicapping 
(rwg = .77), Self-justification (rwg = .74), Undue Autonomy (rwg = .74), Unquestioning 
Deference to Authority (rwg = .89), Unwarranted Compromise (rwg = .83), and Willful 
Ignorance (rwg = .71). 
KLD Ratings 
 Data for ethical decisions was gathered from established ratings by KLD 
Research & Analytics Inc. Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (or KLD) measures are an 
assessment of corporate social responsibility activities and have been used in prior 
research as a surrogate measure of ethicality (Erwin, 2011; Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Stanwick & Stanwick, 2003). KLD began rating firms annually in 1991 although it 
should be noted that not all publically traded organizations receive a KLD rating every 
year or at all. Most organizations within this study sample received a KLD rating at 
least one year during the tenure of the observed leader. KLD rates organizations on 
seven areas of stakeholder consideration based on the organization’s behavior including 
community relations, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, 
environmental performance, human rights, and product characteristics. Because ethical 
decisions in the business world can involve a multiple and varied stakeholders and 
because the criteria for ethical concerns is often multifaceted (i.e. teleological, 
deontological, or justice-based; see, Carroll, 1999; Kaptein, 2009; Godfrey, Hatch, & 
Hansen, 2010; Reidenbach & Robin, 1990), KLD’s evaluation of multiple areas of 
interest allow for consideration of most of the ethical domain. 
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For each area, the organization is rated as either having strengths or concerns. 
The ratings are determined by KLD using information from employee questionnaires, 
annual reports, 10k reports, quarterly reports, proxy statements, and special reports 
released by organizations with specific reference to the evaluated dimensions. For 
purposes of this study, KLD data was used to count the number of organizational events 
related to each observed area during the tenure of the observed leader. Thus, KLD count 
data was representative of organizational decisions that impact stakeholders. The 
number of events leading to either a strength (i.e., ethical decision) or a concern (i.e., 
unethical decision) was then adjusted for the number of years KLD data was assessed 
for that organization during the leader’s tenure. After adjustment, the number of ethical 
decisions reported per organization ranged from 0 to 12.5 (M = 3.52, SD = 2.88), and 
the number of unethical decisions ranged from 0 to 14.33 (M = 2.99, SD = 3.02). A 
single KLD score for the organization was created by subtracting the number of 
concerns from the number of strengths across all categories, a practice common in prior 
research (see, for example, Graves & Waddock, 1994; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Johnson 
& Greening, 1999; Ruf, Muralidhar, Brown, Janney, & Paul, 2001; Sharfman, 1996; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997). KLD scores ranged from -7.17 to 8.50 (M = .53, SD = 
3.15), where the valence indicates propensity towards ethical decisions or unethical 
decisions and the numerical value indicates the relative strength of ethicality.  
Finally, the single KLD scores for the sample were standardized to establish z-
scores based on the variance of the sample. Organizations with a KLD rating of .5 
standard deviations and above were labeled as ethical (n = 16) while organizations with 
a KLD score of .5 standard deviations and below were considered unethical (n = 15). 
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Organizations in between were considered grey (i.e., a mix of ethical and unethical; n = 
24). Separating the organizations into categories allowed for average comparisons of 
organizations as opposed to one-to-one comparisons of individual organizations. The 
complex nature of ethical environments and dynamic interplays between organizations 
and environments suggests that individual comparisons of organizations is less 
informative based on the research questions at hand. 
Organizational Performance Measure 
 Organizational performance can be assessed in many ways. For this study, 
market share value was thought to be the most relevant measure of performance as it 
inherently captures the impact of ethical decisions on various stakeholder groups vis-à-
vis stakeholder willingness to invest capital. Organizational performance was measured 
using daily stock market returns. Returns are the percent change in trading price from 
one time period to another and are an effective way of assessing actual performance as 
they are unaffected by stock splits that may otherwise skew share price data. Historical 
market data is publically available and obtained for this study through from Yahoo 
Finance. Data was collected for each organization in the sample for the time period 
during which the sample leader was responsible for decision making in the 
organization. In addition, the S&P 500 Index value was collected for the same time. The 
S&P 500 Index is considered representative of the market as whole. In other words, the 
S&P 500 Index is representative of the population of organizations publically traded. 
 Returns on the S&P 500 Index were calculated along with returns for each 
organization every day during the leader’s tenure. The two sets of returns were then 
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plotted against one another in order to generate a regression line. The equation of this 
regression, y = βx + a, represents the Market Model where y is the predicted return of 
an organization, β is the degree of elasticity of a given organization with respect to 
fluctuation in the market, x is the observed return of the index (in this case the market as 
a whole), and a is a constant. The Market Model theoretically predicts the expected 
return for any given organization based on market factors and influences (i.e., the 
Market Model accounts for systematic risk associated with the market, an 
organization’s individual response to systematic risk factors, and the return expected on 
investment in a zero-risk settings). A Market Model equation was calculated for each 
organization in the study using the leader’s tenure as the time period for data. Next, a 
predicted return was calculated each day for each organization based on the respective 
Market Model equation. Predicted returns were then subtracted from observed or actual 
returns in order to determine a residual return value and averaged over the leader’s 
tenure. This average residual value represents the average return for the organization 
beyond the influence of the market and its associated factors. The average residual 
return during the leader’s tenure was used to measure organizational performance. 
Control Variables 
 Several control variables thought to potentially influence relationships between 
the study’s main variables based on previous work examining ethical decision making 
(Ford & Richardson, 1994; Low et al., 2000; O’Fallon, & Butterfield, 2005) were 
included in this study. These variables were identified a priori. Control variables were 
primarily demographic in nature, and included elements of both leader demographics 
and organizational demographics. Leader-specific control variables included the gender 
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of the leader, the age of the leader when assuming their leadership position within the 
organization, and the tenure of the organizational leader. Tenure was measured as of 
2005, and age was determined based on the start of the tenured period. Organizational-
level control variables included the size of the organization based on the number of 
employees, length of time the organization existed as of 2012, industry sector, and 
whether or not they were still in existence as of 2012. 
Analyses 
 First, a series of analyses were performed in order to determine the influence of 
control variables on key outcome variables, specifically number of unethical decisions, 
number of ethical decisions, overall ethicality, and organizational performance. Control 
variables that were statistically significant at the .05 level were retained for future 
analyses. Control variables that were not significantly related to outcome variables were 
excluded from further analyses. 
In order to assess the impact of leader decision strategies and biases, a series of 
multiple regression analyses were performed. First, individual biases and compensatory 
strategies were grouped based on the component process of sensemaking (i.e., problem 
identification, information gathering, and information integration) following rational 
keying procedures. Next, a component score was generated for each process. Unethical 
Decisions were regressed on cognitive bias and compensatory strategy component 
scores. Ethical Decisions were regressed on cognitive bias and compensatory strategy 
component scores. Ethicality was regressed on cognitive bias and compensatory 
strategy component scores.  
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To evaluate the impact of leader decisions on organizational performance, 
multiple regressions were performed on biases and strategies upon average residual 
return and an ANOVA was performed to assess differences in average organizational 
performance between ethicality groups. 
Results 
 Cognitive biases were keyed as follows with corresponding interclass 
correlation coefficients: Abdication of Responsibility, Moral Insensitivity, Self-
handicapping, False Consensus, Maintaining the Status Quo, Unquestioning Deference 
to Authority, and Willful Ignorance made up Problem Recognition Biases (α = .71); 
Diffusion of Responsibility, Inadequate Role Balancing, Framing, Naiveté, Undue 
Autonomy, and Unwarranted Compromise made up Information Gathering Biases (α = 
.67); and Changing Norms & Standards, Forcing a Decision, Illusion of Control, and 
Self-justification made up Information Integration Biases (α = .65). Component scores 
were generated for Problem Recognition Biases (M = 1.55, SD = 0.30), Problem 
Gathering Biases (M = 1.58, SD = 0.27), and Problem Integration Biases (M = 1.72, SD 
= 0.37). Compensatory strategies were keyed as follows with corresponding interclass 
correlation coefficients: Deliberative Action, Recognizing Boundaries, Selective 
Engagement, and Understanding Guidelines made up Problem Recognition Strategies 
(α = .72); Maintaining Objective Focus, Monitoring Assumptions, Recognition of 
Insufficient Information, and Value/Norm Assessment made up Information Gathering 
Strategies (α = .86); and Complexity Evaluation, Contingency Planning, Self-
accountability, Strategy Selection, and Striving for Transparency made up Information 
Integration Strategies (α = .84). Component scores were generated for Problem 
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Recognition Strategies (M = 2.24, SD = 0.47), Information Gathering Strategies (M = 
2.00, SD = 0.55), and Information Integration Strategies (M = 2.27, SD = 0.51) 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for cognitive biases and outcome 
variables (Ethical Decisions, Unethical Decisions, Ethicality, and Organizational 
Performance) can be found in Table 4. Ethical Decisions was significantly related to 
Information Gathering Biases (r = -.36). Ethicality was significantly related to Problem 
Recognition Biases (r = -.40) and Information Integration Biases (r = -.27).  
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for compensatory strategies and 
key outcome variables can be found in Table 5. Ethical Decisions was significantly 
related to Information Gathering Strategies (r = 29). Ethicality was significantly related 
to Information Gathering Strategies (r = .41) and Information Integration Strategies (r = 
.35). 
Covariate Analyses 
 Regression analysis of leader-specific control variables indicated Gender 
significantly predicted Ethical Decisions, β = .28, t(53) = 2.09, p = .04, and Ethicality, β 
= .35, t(53) = 2.68, p = .01. Gender did not significantly predict Organizational 
Performance. Leader Age significantly predicted Unethical Decisions, β = .34, t(52) = 
2.77, p = .01. Tenure of the leader was not a significant predictor of key outcome 
variables. Regression analyses of organization-level control variables revealed Length 
of Time in Existence significantly predicted Ethical Decisions, β = .03, t(52) = 3.43, p < 
.01, and Unethical Decisions, β = .03, t(52) = 3.48, p < .01. Whether or not the 
organization was still in existence as of 2012 was not a significant predictor of any 
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outcome variables. Organization Size and Industry Sector were examined using 
ANOVAs due to the categorical nature of the variables. Organization Size was not 
found to significantly predict key outcome variables. Industry Sector was significantly 
related to Unethical Decisions, F(4, 45) = 4.36, p = .01, but not Ethical Decisions or 
Ethicality. Although statistically significant, the Gender variable was not meaningful 
due to large differences in the sample’s demographic composition (61 male leaders and 
4 female leaders). Gender was therefore excluded from further consideration. Length of 
Time in Existence was retained as a covariate in analyzing Ethical Decisions. Leader 
Age, Length of Time in Existence, and Industry Sector were retained as a covariate 
measures for analyses involving Unethical Decisions. All other covariate measures were 
not considered further. 
Cognitive Bias and Compensatory Strategy Analyses 
  Hierarchical, step-wise regression models were constructed for the number of 
Unethical Decisions regressed on cognitive biases while controlling for Length of Time 
in Existence, Industry Sector, and Leader Age. Industry Sector was recoded into 
dummy variables in order to include the categorical data in the regression models. 
Length of Time in Existence, Industry Sector, and Leader Age were entered in Step 1 of 
the regression model. At Step 2, cognitive bias variables were entered in step-wise 
fashion. Significant results were not observed for cognitive biases predicting Unethical 
Decisions. 
Ethical Decisions was regressed on cognitive biases while controlling for Length 
of Time in Existence. Length of Time was enter at Step 1. At Step 2, Problem 
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Recognition Biases, Information Gathering Biases, and Information Integration Biases 
were entered in step-wise fashion. Problem Recognition Biases and Problem Integration 
Biases were not found to be significant predictors at Step 2. Information Gathering 
Biases was retained in the model. A summary of the regression model for Ethical 
Decisions on cognitive biases can be found in Table 6. Information Gathering Biases 
significantly predicted Ethical Decisions, β = -.32, t(51) = 2.66, p = .01, and accounted 
for a significant amount of the observed variance in Ethical Decisions, R2 = .28, 
adjusted R2 = .26, F(1, 51) = 7.07, p = .01.  
Unethical Decisions was regressed on compensatory strategies while controlling 
for Length of Time in Existence, Industry Sector, and Leader Age. No significant 
results were observed in relation to Unethical Decisions and compensatory strategies.  
The number of Ethical Decisions made by the organizational leader was 
regressed on compensatory strategies while controlling for Length of Time in Existence 
in a hierarchical, step-wise model. At Step 1, Length of Time in Existence was entered. 
At Step 2, Problem Recognition Strategies, Information Gathering Strategies, and 
Information Integration Strategies were entered in a step-wise fashion. Problem 
Recognition Strategies and Information Gathering Strategies were not significant at 
Step 2 and therefore removed from the model. A complete summary of the regression 
model for Ethical Decisions on compensatory strategies can be found in Table 7. 
Information Integration Strategies significantly predicted Ethical Decisions, β = .37, 
t(51) = 5.78, p ≤ .001, and accounted for a significant amount of the observed variance 
in Ethical Decisions, R2 = .32, adjusted R2 = .30, F(1, 51) = 10.27, p ≤ .01. 
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 Step-wise regression analyses were performed on Ethicality with cognitive bias 
variables. Information Gathering Biases and Information Integration Biases were not 
found to be significant predictors and were removed from the multiple regression 
model. Problem Recognition Biases significantly predicted Ethicality, β = -.40, t(53) = 
3.22, p ≤ .01, and accounted for a significant portion of variance, R2 = .16, F(1, 53) = 
10.36, p ≤ .01. Step-wise regressions were also performed on Ethicality with 
compensatory strategy variables. Problem Recognition Strategies and Information 
Interpretation Strategies were not found to be significant and were removed from the 
model. Information Gathering Strategies significantly predicted Ethicality, β = .40, t(53) 
= 8.45, p ≤ .01, and accounted for a significant portion of variance, R2 = .17, F(1, 53) = 
10.50, p ≤ .01. 
Organizational Performance Analysis 
 Pair-wise multiple regressions were performed on Organizational Performance 
with cognitive biases and compensatory strategies. No significant results were found. 
Ethicality scores for the sample ranged from -7.17 to 8.50. The mean Ethicality 
was .53 (SD = 3.15). After converting raw Ethicality scores to z-scores for the sample, 
organizations were grouped into three categories; unethical (n = 15), grey (n = 24), and 
ethical (n = 16). Organizations with z-scores less than -.5 made up the unethical group 
(i.e., organizations that made unethical decisions more often than ethical), greater than 
.5 represented the ethical group (i.e., made ethical decisions more often than unethical), 
and organizations in between the two were the grey group, meaning they made both 
ethical and unethical decisions. Average residual market return was used as the measure 
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of Organizational Performance (M = .01; SD = .07). A one-way ANOVA was used to 
explore the relationship between Ethicality group membership and Organizational 
Performance. Organizations that were missing performance data were excluded from 
the analysis. No significant relationship was found between Ethicality group and 
Organizational Performance, F (2, 45) = 1.35, p = .27. 
Limitations 
 Prior to discussing results of this study, its limitations should be noted as any 
discussion or interpretation of results should occur within the context of those 
limitations. First, there are limitations resulting from the historiometric analysis. 
Although Simonton (1990) recommended using biographical sources, this study 
examined both biographical and autobiographical sources in order to capture the 
majority of available material on modern organizations and their leaders. The central 
tenet of this study, Weick’s sensemaking (1995), details a process of receiving 
information and then defining the situation based on that information in relation to prior 
information. Weick (1995) refers to this as retrospective sensemaking and refers to the 
experiences used to organize new information as narratives. Assessing leaders’ decision 
making in this study involved evaluating information pertaining to the narratives 
constructed by the leader. In that regard, autobiographical information may have been 
more appropriate for informing the research questions, in spite of Simonton’s (1990) 
reservations about autobiographical accounts. Additionally, neither leaders nor their 
biographers had any a priori information regarding the specific biases or strategies that 
would be assessed. There is no reason to suspect either group would have skewed their 
accounts with regard to factors of interest in this study or report anything beyond their 
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perceived reality. It is that perceived reality that is of interest during sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995). The expert raters assessing narratives where trained to make inferences 
regarding sensemaking processes based on the narrative accounts described. It is more 
likely that cognitive bias by raters would impact the data when evaluating narratives, 
however the use of multiple expert raters in this study limits that from occurring. The 
decision to examine both biographical and autobiographical narratives in spite of 
Simonton’s (1990) recommendations was made based on trading off internal validity 
concerns for external validity.  
 Another limitation of this study concerns sampling. Not every organizational 
leader during the inclusion period either published an autobiography or had a biography 
published about them, so in this way, the sample obtained is a convenience sample. One 
should be cautious when attempting to generalize results to the entire population of 
organizations and leaders from a limited sample. In order to address this limitation, 
efforts were made to obtain source material from a variety of different venues in an 
attempt to analyze all material available during the time period. However there may be 
unexamined factors that differentially predict which leaders had biographical source 
material printed and which did not. On a similar note, this study is limited to a fairly 
stringent time period (1990-2005) in an effort to examine ethical decisions through the 
lens of appropriately conventional ethical norms. Although attempts were made to 
maximize sample size, availability of data (based on the number of published 
biographies/autobiographies) still limited the sample (n = 65). This limitation should be 
kept in mind when deciding to generalize results from this sample to a broader group. 
41 
 
 The nature of KLD scores should also be considered. Although used in multiple 
studies as a surrogate measure for ethicality (Erwin, 2011; Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Stanwick & Stanwick, 2003), KLD ratings are most often considered to be a measure of 
corporate social responsibility (Rowley & Berman, 2000). Additionally, KLD scores are 
based on the number of ethical and unethical decisions made by organizations. These 
decisions must be reported in some fashion in order for KLD to account for them. While 
the organization does collect information from a variety of sources, some organizational 
decisions may not have been publicized or otherwise accounted for. In term of this 
study, unpublicized decisions would not be of concern to market value as the market is 
driven by the shareholders. However, unpublicized decisions would be of interest when 
analyzing compensatory strategies and cognitive biases of leaders.  
 This study assumes the decisions reported in the KLD database were the result 
of decisions made by organizational leaders. It is possible the some of the strengths or 
concerns reported by KLD resulted from decisions made by other members of the 
organization. However, the sensemaking process can be viewed as either individual or 
collective, however (Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick, 1995, 1998; Weick et al., 2005). 
Within organizations, collective sensemaking is most likely employed as managers and 
leaders actively solicit the input of other members when making decisions on behalf of 
the entire organization. Collective sensemaking within organizations is influenced by all 
individuals that contribute to the social narrative. Leaders, in particular, are likely to 
have a strong impact on the collective narrative based on their visionary influence, 
formal authority, and input into policy generation. As a result, the sensemaking 
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frameworks of leaders are likely to become embedded in the organization narrative and 
internalized by other members through institutionalization (Weber & Glynn, 2006).  
 Finally, certain assumptions are associated with the Market Model that should 
be considered in this study. First, the Market Model is a theory prescribed to by some, 
but not all, economists. The underlying assumption of the Market Model is that the 
market itself should explain all variability in market value. A second assumption is that 
a market index, in this case, the S&P 500 Index, is representative of the entire 
population of market values. While this may be a readily accepted assumption, it is an 
assumption nonetheless as clearly not every publically traded organizations is listed on 
the S&P 500 Index. Accepting these two assumptions allows the use of the Market 
Model equation to predict any organization’s market performance based on the relative 
performance of the market. Any variability beyond in actual value beyond what the 
market predicts is then attributed to organization-level factors that are above and 
beyond the influence of the market itself. These assumptions must be accepted in 
interpreting the results of this study and therefore, to the extent one accepts or does not 
accept them, they must be considered a limitation of the study. 
Discussion 
 With the above limitations in mind, several conclusions may be drawn from the 
results of this study regarding leader ethical decision making in the business world. The 
nature of this study allows for conclusions that inform and extend existing theory, have 
direct practical implications for business leaders, and suggest future avenues of 
research. 
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Theoretical Contributions 
At the macro-level, it was hypothesized (H3) that leader ethical decisions would 
influence financial performance, solidifying the business case for ethics. While the data 
did not support this hypothesis, several considerations should be noted. First, according 
to economists, the Market Model captures all variation in performance associated with 
market factors when valuing an organization. Any impact of ethical decisions by leaders 
can be theoretically subsumed by the market and thus explained by the prediction 
equation for any given organization.  It is plausible that in this study, any financial 
changes resulting from leader decisions were already accounted for in the model and 
therefore little residual variability existed. 
 Market share price has a reciprocal relationship with financial performance and 
the extent to which investors are willing to invest. Share price increases when 
performance signals investors to invest (Spence, 1973, 1974). At the same time, 
increases in the number of investors drives financial performance. In terms of cause and 
effect, it is difficult to assert whether performance is the cause or effect of share price, 
suggesting share value might not be the best measurement of organizational 
performance. Additionally, investors assume some of the organization’s financial risk 
when they chose to invest, and expect to be rewarded for that risk. Once invested in a 
company, shareholders will prefer efficiency gains to effectiveness gains for value 
creation as they generate profit. Other stakeholder groups outside of the shareholders 
are likely to be more interested in effectiveness gains in term of value creation. Thus, 
financial performance indicators are more closely associated with shareholder 
perspectives and less closely related to stakeholder perspectives. While ethical decision 
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making may not generate profit, it likely creates value for stakeholders in other ways 
and should not be overlooked. Organizations may benefit from exploring the indirect 
impact of ethical decision making on profit by examining influences on consumers and 
their reputation.  
In terms of theoretical contribution, while the data did not support advancing the 
instrumental discussion of stakeholder theory as hypothesized a priori, meaningful 
contributions and insights can still be drawn. From a theoretical perspective, H5 
explored the nature of the interplay between stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) and 
signaling theory (Spence, 1973, 1974), suggesting investors would be informed vis-à-
vis signaling of organization performance, health, and well-being and therefore willing 
to invest. It was believed that during times of ethical crises within organizations, leader 
decisions that ameliorated the crisis would encourage current investors to maintain 
investments and encourage potential investors to contribute. However, it is possible that 
because stakeholder management (Freeman, 1984) breaks away from gauging 
performance in terms of efficiencies and profit alone, the financial community (current 
and potential investors) pays little intention to signals that do not immediately influence 
financial profit.  
The question of why one might not observe changes in market value beyond 
market fluctuation should also be considered. If an organization outperforms market 
predictions (i.e., share value increases beyond market prediction) it does so because 
there is greater demand for its shares than there is demand in the market. Greater 
demand increases the price an investor is willing to pay for a share (i.e., the value of a 
share). Investors are willing to give an organization money when they anticipate getting 
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something in return, such as profit from the organization. Share value decreases when 
investors take their money back, or sell their share, because they no longer anticipate a 
return. This increases the supply of shares on the market, decreases demand, and lowers 
the share price. With that simplistic explanation in mind, share price would remain 
unchanged due to two distinct circumstances. First, investments remain the same; 
investors neither purchase nor sell shares. In this case, supply and demand remain 
constant, as does share price. Alternatively, investors purchase shares and sell shares in 
equal quantities. In this case, supply and demand again remain unchanged because 
fluctuations on either side offset each other, and share price will remain constant. When 
ethical events occur, no observed changes in share price beyond those associated with 
market fluctuations suggests either no response by investors, or equal levels of positive 
and negative response. When there is no response investors have either missed or were 
apathetic to signals. Alternatively, some investors may have viewed leader ethical 
decisions regarding stakeholder (Freeman, 1984) groups as signals (Spence, 1974, 
1975) of positive performance while other investors viewed the same signals as signs of 
negative performance. Such individual differences in perception would produce 
offsetting behaviors on average, and yield in aggregate a null effect on supply, demand, 
and share price. Within a sizable population such as the population of investors, having 
roughly equal numbers of offsetting behaviors is likely given concepts such as central 
limit theorem and Sir Ronald Fisher’s ideals of randomization. 
Inherent to signaling theory (Spence, 1974, 1975) is the concept of information 
asymmetry, wherein investors are not immediately privy to all information regarding 
organizations prior to deciding on investment. Another plausible alternative is due to 
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the rapid proliferation of information in today’s world, there is less asymmetry of 
information and investors have become less reliant on signals. In that scenario, investors 
will turn to actual performance measures, such as bottom-line financial performance, 
when making investment decisions. In this case, the proposed link between stakeholder 
theory (Freeman, 1984) and signaling theory (Spence, 1974, 1975) dissolves and micro-
level outcomes associated with ethical behavior (Ashford & Gibbs, 1990; Brown & 
Treviño, 2006; Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005) will not drive macro-level outcomes 
like share price in the manner hypothesized. 
 Turning to the micro-level, results of this study do suggest differences in 
decision making processes yield different outcomes in the face of ethical dilemmas. 
Stakeholder management perspectives (Freeman, 1984) appear to be closely related to 
sensemaking (Weick, 1995) in that considering ethical dilemmas from the sensemaking 
perspective will promote effective mental model construction that sufficiently 
incorporates complexity and considers multiple stakeholders. Based on decision 
outcomes evaluated in this study, sensemaking processes are improved by adopting a 
stakeholder perspective. While H3 was not confirmed to extend stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1984) from an instrumental perspective, the study does support stakeholder 
theory from a normative perspective consistent with earlier suggestions by Donaldson 
and Preston (1995). 
 At the core of this study is Weick’s (1995) sensemaking theory. Sensemaking 
was initially proposed as a way of describing how individuals within organizations 
interpret external stimuli and subsequently behave based on those interpretations. As a 
logical extension, Weick (1995; 1998; 2001) elaborates on the role of the sensemaking 
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process in applied decision making, specifically during times of crisis and in managerial 
settings. Sonenshein (2007) observed sensemaking to be useful theory for explaining 
decision making when faced with ethical dilemmas, likening them to crisis situations. 
Work by Mumford and colleagues (Brock et al., 2008; Caughron et al., 2011; Kligyte et 
al., 2008; Mumford et al., 2008; Mumford et al., 2009a) empirically supported the use 
of sensemaking as an applicable theory for analyzing ethical decision making among 
academic researchers. Findings from this study add generalizability to this stream of 
research by supporting sensemaking as a method of analyzing ethical decisions for 
business leaders. Further, sensemaking theory has been suggested (Weick, 2001; Weick 
et al., 2005) as a framework for improving decision making when “sensemakers” 
carefully attend to skillfully navigating the nuances of the process. In ethical decision 
making, this was demonstrated by identifying a series of strategies associated with 
sensemaking processes that may be used to improve decision outcomes, and a series of 
cognitive biases that interfered with sensemaking processes thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of decision making outcomes (Brock et al., 2008; Caughron et al., 2011; 
Kligyte et al., 2008; Mumford et al., 2008; Mumford et al., 2009a). Results from this 
study build on prior work by specifically examining decision-making processes by 
business leaders in order to identify useful strategies for improving ethical decision 
making and biases that detract from ethical decision outcomes within the business 
domain. In doing so, it extends sensemaking theory and identifies factors involved in 
improving decision making that may enhance, in the language of Weick (2001), 
“wisdom” in today’s organizations.   
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Practical Implications 
The remainder of this study’s findings adds to the growing body of contextual 
research on business ethics clarifying what leaders should do to improve ethical 
decision making (Kahn, 1990; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Specifically, conclusions 
drawn from this work can be used to inform business leaders on what they “should” do 
(Weaver & Treviño, 1994) when engaging in ethical decision making by examining 
what they “actually” do (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008) and those effects. 
 H1a and H1b made predictions regarding the effect of cognitive biases on the 
number of ethical decisions and the number of unethical decisions made by 
organizational leaders. Specifically, H1a predicted cognitive biases increase the number 
of unethical decisions by leaders, and H1b predicted cognitive bias would decrease the 
number of ethical decisions. While only partially supported in that not all biases had 
significant effects, evidence was found to support H1b.  A significant, negative effect 
was found for Information Gathering Biases on the number of ethical decisions made by 
leaders. When confronted with ethical dilemmas, leaders likely know they have to act. 
Thus Problem Recognition biases are not likely to play a role and sensemaking is 
engaged. On a similar note, the levity of the problem at hand is likely to ensure that 
leaders are not subject to biases that influence Information Integration and they will 
actively seek to reach an ethical decision as opposed to exacerbating the dilemma. It 
appears that leader sensemaking gets derailed when gathering and interpreting 
information. 
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 Diffusion of Responsibility, Framing, Inadequate Role Balancing, Naiveté, 
Undue Autonomy, and Unwarranted Compromise are included in Information 
Gathering Biases. In order to prevent bias from interfering with sensemaking and 
reducing ethical decisions, leaders should first be weary of framing issues and not 
underestimate the scope of the ethical dilemma. When gathering information, they 
should be careful about who they are involving in the process and why. For example, 
seeking input from others simply to avoid blame likely results in bad information from 
bad sources. Leaders who fail to consider the limitations of their own knowledge and 
experience are also likely to fail to ask for help from others when needed and to 
inadequately consider the scope of ethical dilemmas as they are limited to their own 
perspective. On a similar note, leaders that feel they are responsible for taking on all 
problems single-handedly are likely to fall victim to the same shortcomings during 
information gathering. In terms of information interpretation, leaders should be 
particularly concerned with achieving balance between various roles. Being overly 
attentive to personal roles and responsibilities, for example, is likely to cause the leader 
to interpret information through personal experiences and value systems limiting their 
perspective. Leader who compromise themselves to make others happy are also limiting 
their perspective and likely addressing peripheral issues rather than root causes.  
 H2a and H2b were concerned with compensatory strategy use during 
sensemaking. Specifically, H3a predicted compensatory strategy use would increase the 
number of good decisions made by leaders, and H3b predicted compensatory strategies 
would decrease the number of bad decisions. Results from the study partially supported 
H3a in that some compensatory strategies had the predicted outcome effects. 
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Information Integration Strategies increased the number of ethical decisions by leaders. 
Combining information into an appropriate mental model is yields improved decision-
making outcomes. Leader sensemaking for ethical decisions is enhanced by Complexity 
Evaluation, Contingency Planning, Self-accountability, Striving for Transparency, and 
Strategy Selection. 
 Leader should begin by ensuring the mental models they construct when faced 
with ethical dilemmas are sufficiently complex. Given the dynamic nature of ethical 
dilemmas, and the level of ambiguity and uncertainty associated with them, more 
complex mental models are necessary to successfully address the problem. Leader 
should also maintain a high degree of personal accountability for the problems that they 
are addressing. Personal accountability is likely to motivate the leader to desire the best 
alternative, reinforcing the building of complex models and continued sensemaking in 
order to arrive at the best alternative. Careful selection of strategies will also help 
ensure the best alternative is reached. However, leaders also must be continually aware 
that even when attempting to choose the best alternative, the likelihood of success is 
uncertain. During ethical crisis, decisions that did not yield anticipated outcomes must 
be corrected swiftly before the damage worsens. Having multiple contingency plans 
allows leaders to react quickly when selected alternatives do not yield desired results. 
Along similar lines, resolution of ethical dilemmas will likely have different effects on 
different stakeholder groups. Some stakeholders may be negatively impacted even when 
the best alternatives are selected. Leaders should therefore by transparent in their 
selection of alternatives. Negative outcomes can be accepted if stakeholders can 
understand that attempts were made to minimize them and no other options were viable. 
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Ethical decisions are reduced when leaders have poor or insufficient information 
and do not allow for broad interpretations of the information provided. Ethical decisions 
are increased when are able to successfully integrate the information they have gathered 
into a complex mental model that allows them to generate and evaluate solution 
alternatives. In terms of sensemaking, Problem Recognition activates sensemaking. 
Once engage, leaders should be trained to minimize biases as they interfere with 
Information Gathering, and interventions should be designed that give leaders tools to 
enhance Information Integration in order to make ethical decisions. 
 Because sensemaking is a retrospective process that Weick (1995) suggests both 
informs and creates reality, it was beneficial to examine leader sensemaking of ethical 
dilemmas from an aggregate perspective over time as well by evaluating multiple 
decision outcomes. The aggregate evaluation captures the dynamic interplay between 
various decisions made by the leader. R1 and R2 were therefore concerned with the 
effect of compensatory strategies and cognitive biases on overall ethicality, a measure 
generated by aggregating individual strengths and weaknesses for each organization. 
Specifically, R1 predicted cognitive bias would reduce Ethicality and R2 predicted 
compensatory strategies would increase Ethicality. Results from the study partially 
supported R1 and R2 in that some, but not all, cognitive biases and compensatory 
strategies predicted Ethicality. 
 Problem Recognition Biases had a negative effect on Ethicality. Across multiple 
decisions, leaders that fail to recognize problems or don’t address them for various 
reasons will not engage in sensemaking. This finding is consistent with Weick’s (1995) 
constructionist perspective. Failing to address an ethical dilemma creates a new 
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situation, with potentially another ethical dilemma. As a result, over time, cognitive 
biases that interfere with problem recognition are particularly insidious. Problem 
Recognition Biases include Abdication of Responsibility, False Consensus, Maintaining 
the Status Quo, Moral Insensitivity, Self-handicapping, Unquestioning Deference to 
Authority, and Willful Ignorance. 
 Willful Ignorance and Moral Insensitivity likely operate by causing the leader 
not to recognize when prior decisions have generated ethical dilemmas. Failing to see 
moral implications of a situation will result in a failure to engage in sensemaking, and 
ignoring negative feedback from prior decisions likely creates new, worse dilemmas. 
Assuming everyone agrees with your decisions is another way in which leaders may fail 
to see moral implications of situations that were created by them. Alternatively, biases 
may sabotage ethicality by suggesting leaders chose not to remedy ethical dilemmas. 
Over time, leaders that have made decisions that results in ethical dilemmas may 
become pensive, self-handicap, and shy away from engaging in future decision making 
efforts. Reinforced fear of the unknown may also result in a preference for risk aversion 
and maintaining the status quo. Leader may also avoid dealing with ethical dilemmas by 
“passing the buck” or hiding behind authority. In any case, Problem Recognition Biases 
reduce Ethicality and attempts should be made to reduce them. 
 Information Gathering Strategies were positively related to Ethicality. Because 
information feeds the mental models constructed during integration, quality and 
quantity of information is critical. In a given situation, Information Integration 
Strategies may be sufficient to yield ethical outcomes, but as each situation builds upon 
the other, Information Gathering Strategies become increasingly important in their 
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influence over subsequent mental models. Information Gathering Strategies include 
Maintaining Objective Focus, Monitoring Assumptions, Recognition of Insufficient 
Information, and Value/Norm Assessment. 
 When gathering and interpreting information over time, leaders will benefit by 
selectively choosing to include past information that is relevant to current problems. In 
addition, leaders should attend to acknowledging when more information is required. 
Relying too heavily on past information, for example, may not sufficiently capture 
complexity going forward. Further, because information is carried forward, leaders 
should pay particular attention to the factors that influence its interpretation. For 
example, personal biases and goals that skew information may not be overly influential 
in one situation, but can have exponential impacts on future decision making. Likewise, 
leaders should pay attention to carefully selecting value systems that are relevant to 
problems at hand. Value systems that were used previously may no longer apply, and 
current information may be interpreted differently when interpreted through a different 
system. Over time, leader may become confused as to which value system to apply and 
when, so paying more attention to Value/Norm Assessment is beneficial. 
   Together, the pattern of results suggests that the influence of component 
sensemaking processes may be slightly different when addressing a single ethical 
dilemma versus navigating the waters of dynamic organization/environment interactions 
over time. However, in either case, leaders should attempt to minimize cognitive bias 
and utilize strategies that enhance sensemaking. Biases negatively affect problem 
recognition and information gathering, in ethical decision making. Compensatory 
strategies improve information gathering and information integration in ethical decision 
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making. Regarding sensemaking, succumbing to biases appears to cause leaders to not 
engage in the process. Once sensemaking is engaged, quantity and quality of 
information is critical and is affected by both bias and strategy use, similar to other 
decision making models (e.g., rational decision making). Specific to sensemaking, 
strategies improve the way leaders integrate information, or develop mental models.   
Analyzing real-world decisions directly addresses Sonenshein’s (2007) call for 
sensemaking research involving ethical decisions to capture the complexity of real life. 
From a practitioner perspective, this study reveals a series of biases that business 
leaders should avoid when engaging in ethical decision making, and a series of 
strategies that can help counteract biases and yield better decisions within organizations. 
Weick et al. (2005) noted that sensemaking can be improved by building specific 
skillsets, and that improved sensemaking will yield better decisions. The compensatory 
strategies revealed in this study define the skillsets that should be improved by leaders 
engaging in sensemaking. Training interventions and executive coaching efforts should 
be designed to decrease cognitive bias and promote the use of the compensatory 
strategies outlined in this study in order to improve ethical decision making. It should 
be noted that compensatory strategies appear to play a larger role in promoting 
successful ethical decision making in that appear to have the effect of overcoming 
specific biases as well as improving sensemaking processes. It should also be noted that 
while useful for improving decision making outcomes, both cognitive bias reduction 
and compensatory strategy usage do not appear to prevent bad decisions from being 
made. This may be viewed as a failure to engage in sensemaking. Weick (1995) notes 
that outcomes of decisions are only realized after the decision is made; we create the 
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reality based on our behaviors. Organizational behaviors that have not been attended to 
by leaders engaged in sensemaking likely created ethical dilemmas to begin with, at 
which point leaders are signaled to engage in sensemaking, including bias reduction and 
compensatory strategy usage, in order to solve the problem. 
Future Research 
These findings also identify avenues of future research that may make additional 
contributions to the conversation. First, future research is needed to examine macro-
level organization outcomes resulting from ethical decision making, specifically 
financial performance. Although support was not found linking sensemaking theory 
(Weick, 1995), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), and signaling theory (Spence, 
1974) to share price, plausible explanations existed for lack of these findings. This 
suggests future research should not assume a lack of connection between ethics and 
financial performance and instead highlights a need to further explore it. Specifically, 
this study suggests exploring specific investor behaviors (e.g., not taking action, buying 
shares, and/or selling shares) during ethical crises and the reasons for that behavior 
(e.g., missed signals, indifference toward signal, feelings regarding support for 
stakeholders, etc.). Additionally, further research connecting micro and macro level 
performance should be explored. Prior research revealed micro-level performance 
outcomes associated with ethical decisions (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Brown et al., 
2005). The current study reveals multiple ways to improve ethical decisions and by 
extension improve associated micro-level outcomes. Continued research should tie 
these micro-level outcomes to macro-level performance in order to fully understand the 
impact of ethical decision making. In addition to financial indicators such as 
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shareholder value, subsequent studies should explore macro-level performance 
indicators or outcomes such as reputation, market share, and culture. Finally, several of 
the biases and compensatory strategies that were assumed a priori to impact 
sensemaking did not appear to have effects in this study, which focused on high-level 
business leaders. Future research should continue to explore all biases and strategies 
across in different contexts and with different samples of leaders. 
Conclusion 
 At a broad level, this study aimed to bridge the gap between science and practice 
by joining what had previously been two separate, but related conversations; business 
ethics and applied behavior ethics. Outcomes from the study achieved that goal. 
Stemming from a lack of pragmatic utility, conversations surrounding business ethics 
within the extant literature (see De George, 1990; Gatewood & Carroll, 1991; 
Velasquez, 1982) were largely left on the academic doorstep. Sensemaking (Weick, 
1995) provided a theoretical framework for analyzing ethical decisions (Mumford et al, 
2008, Sonenshein, 2007; Thiel et al., 2012) that informed pragmatically focused 
conversations on behavioral ethics (Jones, 1991; Treviño et al., 2006). Results from this 
study connect the two by revealing sensemaking to be a useful process for business 
leaders when making ethical decisions, as it affords the opportunity to improve decision 
outcomes by reducing the biases and implementing the strategies identified. 
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Table 1 
Operational Definitions for Cognitive Biases 
Variable Name Operational Definition 
Abdication of 
Responsibility 
 
Inability to take responsibility for a problem 
Changing Norms & 
Standards 
 
Discounting major changes in professional practice 
Diffusion of 
Responsibility 
 
Discussing problems with others in order to allow blame for a poor decision to 
be shared so that individuals feel less responsible than if they had made the 
decision alone 
False Consensus 
 
The tendency of individuals to assume that others share their way of thinking 
and acting in a situation 
Forcing a Decision 
 
Making an arbitrary decision in order to have an answer and escape the feeling 
of doubt and uncertainty 
Framing 
 
Inappropriately defining a situation as too narrow or too broad 
Illusion of Control 
 
Failing to recognize the dynamic nature of a situation because of an unrealistic 
assessment of one’s ability to control the situation 
Inadequate Role 
Balancing 
 
Unequal recognition of one’s roles and corresponding responsibilities 
Maintaining the Status 
Quo 
 
Failing to act, or acting in a specific way, in order to maintain the modus 
operandi and avoid negative consequences 
Moral Insensitivity 
 
Unawareness of how one’s actions affect others; specifically, failure to 
recognize ethical aspects of a situation and/or an inaccurate assessment of the 
importance of ethical implications of a situation 
Naiveté 
 
Failure to recognize the boundaries of one’s knowledge and expertise 
pertaining to a given situation 
Self-handicapping 
 
Creating and drawing attention to obstacles in order to protect oneself from 
potential failure 
Self-justification 
 
Reducing dissonance by justifying behaviors and deny negative feedback when 
facing a situation where behavior is inconsistent with beliefs 
Undue Autonomy 
 
Taking on excessive responsibilities beyond one’s capabilities 
Unquestioning 
Deference to Authority 
 
Always accepting (without question) the opinions, guidance, and strategies 
utilized by professional authorities 
Unwarranted 
Compromise 
 
Compromising personal standards in order to avoid conflict 
Willful Ignorance 
 
Ignorance to outcome information that would cause one to move backwards, 
abandon current plans, or face negative consequences 
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Table 2 
Operational Definitions for Compensatory Strategies 
Variable Name Operational Definition 
Complexity Evaluation 
 
Examining the different elements (contingencies, causes, restrictions, goals) in 
a situation and the dynamic relationship between the elements 
Contingency Planning 
 
Thinking about multiple alternatives in light of multiple consequences; 
developing back-up plans 
Deliberative Action 
 
Taking planned action when confronted with a problem 
Maintaining Objective 
Focus 
 
Being aware of personal biases, and the impact of personal goals and 
stereotypes 
Monitoring 
Assumptions 
 
Reducing faulty or irrational assumptions one makes of others or of a situation 
by drawing upon relevant past experiences or examples rather than relying 
upon one’s beliefs about others or the situation 
Recognition of 
Insufficient Information 
 
Understanding that more information is required to form an opinion or to make 
a decision 
Recognizing 
Boundaries 
 
Having an accurate assessment about one’s expertise in relation to a situation, 
an awareness of formal role boundaries, and an understanding of the power 
structure within the organization 
Selective Engagement 
 
Considering personal cost or limitations as a means of deciding whether to 
become involved in a situation 
Self-accountability 
 
Abiding by personal ethics, being honest with oneself, and being responsible 
for what one says and does 
Strategy Selection 
 
Reflecting on the dynamics of a situation, one’s preference for a strategy, and 
one’s belief that a strategy will be successful and efficient, as a means of 
choosing a decision making strategy 
Striving for 
Transparency 
 
Emphasizing maintaining transparency in decision making 
Understanding 
Guidelines 
 
Knowledge of the content and when to apply the field and professional 
guidelines 
Value/Norm 
Assessment 
Awareness of the relevant values systems and using them when appropriate 
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Table 3 
Leaders, Organizations, and Covariates 
 Leader-specific Variables  Organization-specific Variables 
Leader Gender Agea Tenureb Organization Sectorc Sized Timee Existf 
Bill Gates Male 23 22 Microsoft Tech L 37 Y 
A. G. Lafley Male 53 5 Proctor & 
Gamble 
Con L 175 Y 
Al Dunlap Male 59 2 Sunbeam-Oster Con L 91 N 
Andrea Jung Female 40 6 Avon Products, 
Inc. 
Con L 126 Y 
Andy Grove Male 51 11 Intel  Tech L 44 Y 
August Busch III Male 37 28 Anheuser-Busch Con L 646 Y 
Bernard Ebbers Male 54 7 WorldCom Tech L 7 N 
Bill Howell Male 45 11 JC Penney Serv L 110 Y 
C. Paul Johnson Male   First Colonial 
Bankshares Corp 
Fin    
Carly Fiorina Female 49 6 Hewlett Packard Tech L 73 Y 
Dana G. Mead Male 63 5 Tenneco Con L 25 Y 
David Neeleman Male 43 3 Jetblue Serv L 14 Y 
David Novak Male 47 5 Yum! Brands, Inc Serv L 15 Y 
Dennis 
Kozlowski 
Male 46 10 Tyco, Int Serv L 52 Y 
Dick Fuld Male 48 14 Lehman Brothers Fin L 158 N 
Donald Trump Male 49 10 Trump Hotel and 
Casino Resorts 
Serv   N 
Ed Whitacre Male 47 17 Southwestern 
Bell (SBC) 
Tech L 130 N 
Edward 
McCracken 
Male 40 14 Silicon Graphics Tech L 30 Y 
Eli Broad Male 38 28 Sun America 
(AIG) 
Fin  28 N 
Eric Schmidt Male 46 4 Google Tech L 14 Y 
Note: a age of leader at start of tenure; b length of time in leadership position with organization as of 2005; c Tech = 
Technology, Con = Consumer Goods, Serv = Services, Fin = Financial; d L = > 5,000 employees, M = 500 – 5,000 
employees, S = < 500 employees; e length of time organization existed as of 2012; f Y = organization still exists as of 
2012, N = organization no longer exists as of 2012  
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Table 3: Continued 
Leaders, Organizations, and Covariates 
 Leader-specific Variables  Organization-specific Variables 
Leader Gender Agea Tenureb Organization Sectorc Sized Timee Existf 
Gordon Eubanks Male 40 13 Symantec Tech L 30 Y 
Hank Greenberg Male 43 37 AIG Fin L 93 Y 
Herb Kelleher Male 50 20 Southwest 
Airlines 
Serv L 45 Y 
Howard Lutnick Male 43 1 BGC Partners Fin M 8 Y 
Howard Schultz Male 34 13 Starbucks Serv L 25 Y 
J.W. Bill Marriot, 
Jr. 
Male 39 34 Marriot 
International, Inc 
Serv L 41 Y 
Jack Welch Male 45 23 GE other L 120 Y 
James Cayne Male 59 15 Bear Sterns Fin L 85 N 
Jeff Bezos Male 30 11 Amazon.com Serv L 28 Y 
Jeff Immelt Male 45 5 GE other L 120 Y 
Jerry Levin Male  9 AOL Time 
Warner 
Serv L 27 Y 
Jim Osterreicher Male 53 5 JC Penney Serv L 110 Y 
John Warnock Male 45 16 Adobe Systems Tech L 30 Y 
Ken Olsen Male 30 36 Digital 
Equipment Co. 
Tech L 42 N 
Kenneth 
Chenault 
Male 50 4 American 
Express 
Fin L 162 Y 
Kenneth Lay Male 43 17 Enron other L 17 N 
Larry Ellison Male 33 28 Oracle Tech L 35 Y 
Lee Iacocca Male 54 14 Chrysler 
Corporation 
Con L 73 N 
Lee Raymond Male 55 12 Exxon Mobil other L 142 Y 
Marc Andreesen Male 24 4 Netscape Tech    
Martha Stewart Female 55 19 Martha Stewart 
Living 
Omnimedia 
Serv S 16 Y 
Meg Whitman Female 42 7 Ebay Serv L 17 Y 
Note: a age of leader at start of tenure; b length of time in leadership position with organization as of 2005; c Tech = 
Technology, Con = Consumer Goods, Serv = Services, Fin = Financial; d L = > 5,000 employees, M = 500 – 5,000 
employees, S = < 500 employees; e length of time organization existed as of 2012; f Y = organization still exists as of 
2012, N = organization no longer exists as of 2012  
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Table 3: Continued 
Leaders, Organizations, and Covariates 
 Leader-specific Variables  Organization-specific Variables 
Leader Gender Agea Tenureb Organization Sectorc Sized Timee Existf 
Michael Dell Male 19 21 Dell Computer Tech L 28 Y 
Michael Eisner Male 42 21 Walt Disney 
Company 
Serv L 89 Y 
Neville Isdell Male 61 1 The Coca-Cola 
Company 
Con L 126 Y 
Paul Oreffice Male 51 14 Dow Chemicals other L 115 Y 
Peter Guber Male 47 6 Sony 
Entertainment 
Con L 66 Y 
Philip J. Purcell Male 54 8 Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter 
Fin L 77 Y 
Randal Tobias Male 51 6 Eli Lilly and Co. other L 136 Y 
Richard J. 
Wagoner 
Male 47 5 General Motors Con L 104 Y 
Richard Murdock Male 45 6 CellPro other S  N 
Robert Rodin Male 39 3 Marshall 
Industries 
Tech  15 N 
Roberto Goizueta Male 49 17 The Coca-Cola 
Company 
Con L 126 Y 
Roger Ailes Male 56 9 Fox News (21st 
Century FOX) 
Serv L  Y 
Roy Vagelos Male 56 21 Merck & Co, Inc. other L 121 Y 
Ryan Blair Male 28 1 Visalus Sciences 
(Blyth, Inc) 
Con M 36 Y 
Steve Case Male 33 12 America Online Tech L 27 Y 
Steve Jobs Male 42 8 Apple Inc.  Con L 35 Y 
Summer 
Redstone 
Male 64 18 Viacom, Inc. Serv L 25 Y 
T. Boone Pickens Male 28 40 Mesa Petroleum other  43 N 
Ted Turner Male 32 26 Turner 
Broadcasting 
Systems, Inc. 
Serv L 26 N 
Thomas Bloch Male 38 3 H&R Block Serv L 66 Y 
Tim Power Male 48 3 Hubbell 
Incorporated 
other L 124 Y 
TJ Rogers Male 34 23 Cypress 
Semiconductor 
Tech M 30 Y 
Warren Buffet Male 34 41 Berkshire 
Hathaway 
Fin L 123 Y 
Note: a age of leader at start of tenure; b length of time in leadership position with organization as of 2005; c Tech = 
Technology, Con = Consumer Goods, Serv = Services, Fin = Financial; d L = > 5,000 employees, M = 500 – 5,000 
employees, S = < 500 employees; e length of time organization existed as of 2012; f Y = organization still exists as of 
2012, N = organization no longer exists as of 2012 
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Table 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Key Outcome Variables and Cognitive Biases 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Ethical Decisions 3.52 2.88 --       
2. Unethical Decisions 2.99 3.02  .43** --      
3. Ethicality 0.53 3.15  .50**  -.57** --     
4. Performancea 0.01 0.06  .12  .02  .08 --    
5. Problem Recognition Biases 1.55 0.30  -.26  .18  -.40**  -.07 --   
6. Information Gathering Biases 1.58 0.27  -.36**  -.19  -.15  -.11  .64** --  
7. Information Integration Biases 1.72 0.37  -.14  .15  -.27*  -.12  .76**  .75** -- 
Note: a Performance is presented as average residual return percentage; * = significant correlation at  
the .05 level; ** = significant correlation at the .01 level 
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Table 5 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Key Outcome Variables and Compensatory Strategies 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Ethical Decisions 3.52 2.88 --       
2. Unethical Decisions 2.99 3.02  .43** --      
3. Ethicality 0.53 3.15  .50**  -.57** --     
4. Performancea 0.01 0.06  .12  .02  .08 --    
5. 
Problem Recognition 
Strategies 2.24 0.47  .23  -.03  .23  -.03 --   
6. 
Information Gathering 
Strategies 2.00 0.55  .29*  -.15  .41**  -.05  .82** --  
7. 
Information Integration 
Strategies 2.27 0.51  .32  .06  .35**  .08  .82**  .87** -- 
Note: a Performance is presented as average residual return percentage; * = significant correlation at  
the .05 level; ** = significant correlation at the .01 level 
  
8
2
 
83 
 
Table 6 
Regressions for Ethical Decisions on Cognitive Biases 
 B SE B β 
Step 1      
 Constant  1.86 0.62   
 
Length of Time in 
Existence  0.03 0.01  .43* 
Step 2      
 Constant  8.99 2.74   
 
Length of Time in 
Existence  0.02 0.01  .37* 
 
Information Gathering 
Biases - 4.44 1.67 - .32* 
Note: R2 = .19 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .10 for Step 2 (p ≤ .01); * = p ≤ .01  
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Table 7 
Regressions for Ethical Decisions on Compensatory Strategies 
 B SE B β 
Step 1      
 Constant  1.86 0.62   
 
Length of Time in 
Existence  0.03 0.01  .43* 
Step 2      
 Constant - 2.97 1.61   
 
Length of Time in 
Existence  0.03 0.01  .48* 
 
Information 
Integration Strategies  2.06 0.65  .37* 
Note R2 = .19 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .14 for Step 2 (p ≤ .01);  * = p ≤ .01 
 
  
85 
 
Appendix B: Rater Training Guide 
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RATER TRAINING MANUAL 
 
Overview and Purpose: 
The decisions made by business leaders are critical to the success of the organizations 
they represent. In this study we will examine the decision making processes of business 
leaders by reading select passages from biographical and/or autobiographical material. 
 
Prior research has suggested that leaders engage in a process called sensemaking when 
attempting to make decisions in complicated and uncertain environments. The business 
environment is may be characterized as exactly that; complicated and uncertain. 
 
When engaged in sensemaking, prior research has also indicated the process can be 
hampered by the presence of cognitive biases that impact information and it’s 
interpretation. On the other hand, research has also demonstrated the process can be 
improved (yielding more desirable outcomes) by using strategies designed to facilitate 
sensemaking.  
 
The purpose of this manual is to provide detailed instructions for coding the variables of 
interest.  These detailed instructions help to ensure the reliability of the scores obtained 
from this study.  Expert raters will be trained in the use of these coding materials and 
will utilize this information for reference throughout the coding process. 
 
Specifically, as an expert rater, you will read the assigned passages, paying particular 
attention to any time when decision making is discussed either explicitly or implicitly. 
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After reading the passage, you will reflect on the leaders’ decisions and decision 
making process, and code the extent to which they demonstrated specific cognitive 
biases in their thought patterns, and the extent to which they demonstrated utilization of 
specific compensatory strategies. 
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Cognitive Bias Variables 
 
Variable 1: Abdication of Responsibility 
Definition: Inability to take responsibility for a problem 
Things to look for: 
 Assigning others to take responsibility of one’s personal obligations  
 Not willing to take responsibility of something that has ethical implications, but 
is not part of your duties 
 Blaming someone else for the problem 
 Claiming ignorance 
 Telling others what decision should be made, but passing responsibility of the 
choice onto them 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 2: Changing Norms and Standards 
Definition: Discounting major changes in professional practice. This bias is more likely 
to be exhibited by people who have spent considerable time in a field. 
Things to look for: 
 Making a decision exclusively off of old training 
 Unwillingness to learn new practices (perhaps due to difficulty or seeing them as 
unnecessary) 
 Assuming that what worked at the beginning of one’s career will work at the end 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 3: Diffusion of Responsibility 
Definition: Discussing a problem with others in order to allow blame for a poor decision 
to be shared, so that individuals feel less personally responsible for the decision than if 
they had made the decision alone 
Things to look for: 
 Asking "permission" before making a decision 
 Involving others in the decision (for the purpose of reducing accountability) 
 Informing others of your plans and/or decision for reassurance 
 Believing that if no one has "stopped" you, what you’re doing is okay 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 4: False Consensus 
Definition: The tendency of individuals to assume that others share their way of 
thinking about and acting in a situation 
Things to look for: 
 Assumes that others have the same routines as themselves in making decisions 
 Bases one’s judgment/decisions under the assumptions that others would have 
done the same 
 Generalize one’s own beliefs to others 
 Assumes that other’s beliefs are the same as one’s own beliefs 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 5: Forcing a Decision 
Definition: Making an arbitrary decision in order to have an answer and to escape the 
feeling of doubt and uncertainty 
Things to look for: 
 Seek a feeling of completion rather than the right solution by making any 
decision 
 Making a decision that does not address the core problem 
 Making a decision that only solves a peripheral problem, thus satisfying the 
need to make a decision at all 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 6: Framing 
Definition: Inappropriately defining a situation as too narrow or too broad 
Things to look for: 
 Trying to solve aspects of the problem that do not address the core issues 
 Taking steps in the wrong direction due to a lack of understanding of the 
situation 
 Not considering one’s poor decisions as the cause for the problem- and therefore 
focusing on external causes rather than internal ones 
 Thinking that the consequences of the problem are less far reaching than they 
really are 
 Taking into consideration only that information which is readily available 
 Extent of information that one considers 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 7: Illusion of Control 
Definition: Failing to recognize the dynamic nature of the situation because of an 
unrealistic assessment of their ability to control the situation 
Things to look for: 
 Attempting to solve an ambiguous situation oneself when it’s clear that other 
perspectives are needed 
 Involving too few people in the decision-making/problem solving process 
 Acting too quickly; before the critical aspects of a situation have been identified 
 Taking responsibilities away from others after a problem has risen 
 Overestimate one’s capabilities 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 8: Inadequate Role Balancing 
Definition: Unequal recognition of one’s roles and corresponding responsibilities 
Things to look for: 
 Spending majority of one’s time on responsibilities pertaining to only a few 
personal roles 
 Showing indifference or disregard to problems or consequences that arise within 
neglected roles 
 Allowing others to make decisions within one’s personal roles 
 Taking on additional responsibilities within one role to better justify neglecting 
responsibilities in another role 
 Time management (personal and professional) 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 9: Maintaining Status Quo 
Definition: Failing to act or acting in a specific way to maintain the modus operandi in 
order to avoid negative consequences 
Things to look for: 
 Avoid making specific decisions when risk is involved 
 Removing oneself from decision making process pertaining to one’s 
responsibilities 
 Disillusioning oneself that no action is needed when in fact it is 
 Ignoring already existing problems 
 Continuing to act in a manner that discourages change 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 10: Moral Insensitivity 
Definition: Unawareness of how one’s actions affect others; specifically, failure to 
recognize ethical aspects of a situation and/or an inaccurate assessment of the 
importance of ethical implications of a situation 
Things to look for: 
 Misinterprets or misstates ethical implications of a situation 
 Shows disregard towards impact on others 
 Shows disregard toward consequences of one’s actions 
 Ignores the ethical aspects of a situation 
 Misattribution of the causes of the situation (Fundamental Attribution Error) 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 11: Naiveté 
Definition: Failure to recognize the boundaries of one’s knowledge and expertise 
required in a given situation 
Things to look for: 
 Making a decision without requisite expertise 
 Operating outside one’s area of expertise 
 Acting or making decisions based solely on one’s own understanding of a 
situation and not consulting others 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 12: Self-handicapping 
Definition: Creating and drawing attention to obstacles in order to protect themselves 
from potential failure 
Things to look for: 
 Highlighting the difficult nature of the issue at hand 
 Creating unnecessary obstacles for fear of potential failure 
 When questioned by others regarding the (potential) failure, one would 
overemphasize the difficulties encountered or other distal causes 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 13: Self-justification 
Definition: Reducing dissonance by justifying behaviors and deny negative feedback 
when facing a situation where behavior is inconsistent with beliefs 
Things to look for: 
 Focusing on the positive elements of one’s actions while leaving out negative 
information 
 Ignoring one’s emotions and focusing only on one’s rationale in making 
decisions 
 "Coming clean" justifies prior wrong-doing 
 Being ethical in one situation justifies unethical behavior in another situation 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 14: Undue Autonomy 
Definition: Taking excessive responsibilities beyond one’s capabilities 
Things to look for: 
 Assume that one has the capabilities of taking care of the issue at hand 
 Take on too many responsibilities while underestimate one’s capabilities and 
availability 
 Failure to decline others’ repeated requests for assistance 
 Stripping others of responsibilities and tackling them alone 
 Delegates responsibilities to a lesser extent than should be expected 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 15: Unquestioning Deference to Authority 
Definition: Always accepting, without question, the opinions, guidance, and strategies 
utilized by professional authorities 
Things to look for: 
 Believing that an authority figure or mentor’s recommendation is always correct 
 Making a decision solely based on the recommendation of an authority figure  
 Taking a selected course of action because the authority figure told you it was 
the correct action to take without consideration of possible outcomes 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 16: Unwarranted Compromise 
Definition: Compromising personal standards in order to avoid conflict 
Things to look for: 
 Redoing your own work to satisfy an outside party’s interest 
 Making unnecessary sacrifices in your own work 
 Not standing up for yourself 
 Delaying one’s work for the benefit of others 
 Giving in to other’s demands to prevent negative outcomes for the other party 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 17: Willful Ignorance 
Definition: Ignorance of outcomes of information that would cause one to move 
backwards, abandon, current plans, or to face negative consequences 
Things to look for: 
 Avoiding those would provide negative information pertaining to a situation 
 Delivering information only about the positive aspects of the plan 
 Minimizing the impact of potential obstacles 
 Punishing or becoming angry with those who challenge one’s ideas and plans 
 Showing disregard to alternative plans or information that are inconsistent with 
current ideas and plans 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this bias when 
making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this bias, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; bias 
is largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific bias 
in decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
bias through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific bias 
is prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Compensatory Strategy Variables 
 
Variable 1: Complexity Evaluation 
Definition: Examining the different elements (contingencies, causes, restrictions, goals) 
in a situation and the dynamic relationship between the elements 
Things to look for: 
 Considering the relevant contingencies at play in a situation 
 Determining the causes of a problem 
 Understanding the different goals of different parties in a situation 
 Thinking about how the different elements in a situation are interrelated, and 
adjusting behavior accordingly 
 Making a reasonable estimation of the problem in its entirety 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 2: Contingency Planning 
Definition: Thinking about multiple alternatives in light of multiple consequences; 
developing back-up plans 
Things to look for: 
 Considering the consequences of one’s actions 
 Coming up with back-up plans, in case one’s original plan fails 
 Considering the factors that might lead to plan failure 
 Considering how to address factors that might lead to plan failure 
 Considering different potential ways to address a problem 
 Not reactive... actively plan for negative outcomes 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 3: Deliberative Action 
Definition: Taking planned action when confronted with a problem 
Things to look for: 
 Forecast potential outcomes of different behaviors 
 Considering potential actions and evaluating their relative effectiveness before 
acting 
 Taking purposeful action, especially as opposed to inaction 
 Avoid overreacting – remains calm and rational for entire interview 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 4: Maintaining Objective Focus 
Definition: Being aware of personal biases, and the impact of personal goals and 
stereotypes 
Things to look for: 
 Being mindful about the potential impact of personal biases 
 Questioning oneself regarding ones’ personal incentives/goals/stereotypes 
before making an decision 
 Agency theory – are your goals different than the organization 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 5: Monitoring Assumptions 
Definition: Reducing the faulty or irrational assumptions one makes of others or of a 
situation by drawing upon relevant past experiences or examples rather than solely 
relying upon one’s beliefs about others or the situation 
Things to look for: 
 Challenging one’s initial assumptions by willfully thinking of alternatives 
 Discussing one’s assumptions with others 
 Making concrete plans that include forecasts of outcomes when making 
decisions 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 6: Recognition of Insufficient Information 
Definition: Understanding that more information is required to form an opinion or to 
make a decision 
Things to look for: 
 Recognizing the boundaries of one’s own knowledge or understanding 
 Pointing out deficiencies in information provided 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 7: Recognizing Boundaries 
Definition: Having an accurate assessment about one’s expertise in relation to situation 
at hand, an awareness of formal role boundaries, and an understanding of the power 
structure of the organization 
Things to look for: 
 Being accurate in assessing whether one has the capabilities of taking care of the 
issue at hand 
 Asking others with expertise for help when the problem at hand is not one’s 
daily routine 
 Understanding the power structure of the organization 
 Not getting involved with problems that are outside of one’s role boundaries 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 8: Selective Engagement 
Definition: Considering personal costs or one’s personal limitations as a means of 
deciding whether to become involved in a situation 
Things to look for: 
 Only taking on responsibilities that fall within the bounds of one’s expertise 
 Seeking the assistance of others or delegating responsibilities when lacking 
qualification or knowledge to make a decision – getting a consultant 
 Considering whether getting involved is appropriate given: 
o Amount of influence 
o Disruption that may occur 
o New problems that may arise 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 9: Self-accountability 
Definition: Abiding by personal ethics, being honest with oneself, and being responsible 
for what one says and does 
Things to look for: 
 Using personal beliefs and personal ethics to guide judgment and decision-
making 
 Acting in accordance with one’s personal standards 
 Following through with one’s decisions 
 Gun-sticking 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 10: Strategy Selection 
Definition: Reflecting on the dynamics of a situation, one’s preference for a strategy, 
and one’s belief that a strategy will be successful and efficient, as a means of choosing a 
decision making strategy 
Things to look for: 
 Actively identifying the key components of a situation in order choose a strategy 
 Forecasting the outcomes of a strategy application 
 Discussing potential strategy approaches with others 
 Drawing upon previous experiences in similar situations 
 Considering interactions among potential strategies 
 Using a strategic to understand problems 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 11: Striving for Transparency 
Definition: Emphasizing maintaining transparency in decision making 
Things to look for: 
 Making one’s work public domain 
 Creating records of behavior and decisions 
 Making information available to relevant parties 
 SPECIFICALLY discusses trying to be transparent 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 12: Understanding Guidelines 
Definition: Knowledge of the content and when to apply the field and professional 
guidelines  
Things to look for: 
 Being knowledgeable about relevant professional guidelines 
 Being aware of potential differences of guidelines across fields 
 Being mindful about the contingencies of guideline applications 
 Doesn’t include laws... just norms within professional fields 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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Variable 13: Value/Norm Assessment 
Definition: Awareness of the relevant values systems and using them when appropriate 
Things to look for: 
 Knowledge of society’s value systems 
 Knowledge of personal value systems 
 Understanding how personal values and society values interact 
 Understanding when different values are relevant to apply to a situation 
 
Scale: 
 
1 
None 
2 
Low 
3 
Moderate 
4 
High 
5 
Pervasive 
The leader 
does not, 
either 
explicitly or 
implicitly, 
demonstrate 
this strategy 
when making 
decisions  
Leader 
decision 
making seems 
to suggest a 
general 
presence of 
this strategy, 
although 
specific, 
concrete 
examples  
were not 
present; 
strategy is 
largely 
inferred 
implicitly in 
processes 
Leader 
demonstrates 
at least one 
explicit 
examples of 
specific 
strategy in 
decision 
making 
Leader 
demonstrates 
consistent use 
of specific 
strategy 
through 
multiple, 
explicit 
examples 
Specific 
strategy is 
prevalent in 
all observed 
leader 
decisions 
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